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HIGH COURT STUDY 
A JUDGE IN FULL:  
WALLACE JEFFERSON OF TEXAS 
 
Michael Ariens* 
During his eight years as Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme 
Court, Wallace Jefferson has written a number of deeply engaging 
opinions that illustrate his command of the work required of an 
appellate judge.1  These opinions are both thorough and thoughtful, 
and neither obtuse, nor shallow.  They mark a judge well-versed in 
jurisprudence and in the ongoing debates about how judges 
construct and interpret statutes, the common law, and the 
constitution.  His opinions indicate both his confidence in his 
conclusions and a humility cognizant of his fallibility.  His opinions 
have also occasionally generated objections, as Texas law has 
changed during the past decade.  Chief Justice Jefferson‘s opinions 
reflect a judge in full; one who possesses a deep knowledge of law 
and the peculiarities and particularities of the state and the people 
he serves. 
This essay discusses the work of Chief Justice Jefferson.  His 
work should be understood in light of the unusual division of 
appellate power in Texas, as well as the shifting but exclusively 
Republican composition of the membership of the Supreme Court of 
Texas since during his service there.2 
 
* Professor, St. Mary‘s University School of Law.  Thanks to Lauren Valkenaar for her 
excellent research assistance.  In the interest of full disclosure, then-attorney Wallace 
Jefferson and I served on a special committee for St. Mary‘s University School of Law in the 
mid-1990s.  This was our only significant interaction. 
1 See Chief Justice Wallace B. Jefferson, SUP. CT. TEX., 
http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/court/justice_wjefferson.asp (last updated Sept. 13, 
2011) (noting that Chief Justice Wallace Jefferson was appointed on September 14, 2004). 
2 See MICHAEL ARIENS, LONE STAR LAW: A LEGAL HISTORY OF TEXAS 210 (2011) (noting 
that since 1999 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has been made up of Republicans); 
Justices of the Court: The Supreme Court of Texas, SUP. CT. TEX., 
http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/court/justices.asp (last updated June 13, 2011) (listing 
the nine justices who make up the composition of the Texas Supreme Court); Texas Supreme 
Court, Leadership Directory, REPUBLICAN PARTY TEX., http://www.texasgop.org/texas-
supreme-court (last visited Mar. 15, 2012) (listing the same nine justices of the Texas 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Background 
Wallace Jefferson was born on July 22, 1963, in Tacoma, 
Washington, the second youngest of six children.3  When he was 
four his parents moved to San Antonio, where Jefferson was raised.4  
After graduating from high school, Jefferson attended and 
graduated from Michigan State University with a degree in 
philosophy.5  His older brother Lamont recommended he consider 
attending the University of Texas School of Law.6  Jefferson took his 
brother‘s advice, graduating from the University of Texas Law 
School in 1988.7  He practiced law in the San Antonio firm of Groce, 
Locke & Hebdon, and with two other appellate lawyers, created the 
firm of Crofts, Callaway & Jefferson, also in San Antonio.8  Among 
his appellate cases were two appearances before the Supreme Court 
of the United States.9  In March 2001, at just thirty-seven-years-old, 
he was appointed associate justice of the Texas Supreme Court by 
fellow Republican Governor Rick Perry.10  In late 2004, Perry 
appointed him chief justice.11 As required by the Texas 
Constitution, he ran in the next election to serve the remainder of 
his predecessor‘s term.12  He was re-elected to a full six-year term as 
chief justice in the November 2008 elections.13  As is almost always 
 
Supreme Court as members and leaders of the Republican Party).  
3 Biography: Chief Justice Wallace B. Jefferson, PROJECT VOTE SMART, [hereinafter 
Biography], http://www.votesmart.org/candidate/biography/59079/wallace-jefferson (last 
visited May 15, 2012) (stating that Chief Justice Jefferson was born on July 22, 1963); Kevin 
Priestner, Profile, Wallace Jefferson, 66 TEX. B. J. 405, 406 (2003). 
4 Priestner, supra note 3, at 406. 
5 The Honorable Wallace B. Jefferson, Law School Foundation, U. TEX. SCH. L., 
http://www.utexas.edu/law/about/foundation/trustees/jefferson.html (last visited May 15, 
2012); see Priestner, supra note 3, at 406. 
6 See Priestner, supra note 3, at 406. 
7 The Honorable Wallace B. Jefferson, Law School Foundation, supra note 5; see Priestner, 
supra note 3, at 406–07.  
8 Jefferson Named Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme Court, 67 TEX. B.J. 732, 732 (2004); 
Priestner, supra note 3, at 405. 
9 Chief Justice Wallace B. Jefferson, supra note 1; Priestner, supra note 3, at 405. 
10 Biography, supra note 3 (noting that Chief Justice Jefferson was born on July 22, 1963, 
therefore making him thirty-seven as of March 2001); Chief Justice Wallace B. Jefferson, 
supra note 1 (noting that Jefferson was appointed in March 2011 by Governor Perry); 
Statewide Officials, REPUBLICAN PARTY TEX., http://www.texasgop.org/statewide-officials (last 
visited May 15, 2012) (listing Governor Rick Perry as a member of the Republican Party). 
11 Chief Justice Wallace B. Jefferson, supra note 1. 
12 See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 28(a); Chief Justice Wallace B. Jefferson, supra note 1. 
13 See Chief Justice Wallace B. Jefferson, supra note 1 (noting that his current term ends 
December 21, 2014). 
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stated in articles about Jefferson, he is the first African-American 
justice (as well as chief justice) in the history of the Texas Supreme 
Court.14  He is currently the Texas Supreme Court‘s second-longest 
serving member, to Justice Nathan Hecht‘s twenty-three-plus 
years.15 
B. Texas Appellate Court System 
Since Texas adopted its 1876 Constitution, the Texas Supreme 
Court‘s jurisdiction has been limited to civil matters.16  From that 
year through 1891 all criminal matters were appealed to the Texas 
Court of Appeals,17 a court that became a national laughingstock for 
its astounding rate of reversals of convictions18 and its decision to 
chastise the Supreme Court of the United States.19  The members of 
the convention drafting the Texas Constitution separated appellate 
jurisdiction to remedy a persistent problem in Texas legal history: 
too few appellate judges (and courts) to hear and decide appeals in a 
timely manner.20  This initial division of authority failed to solve the 
problem.21  An 1891 amendment created the Court of Criminal 
Appeals, which possessed jurisdiction in all criminal cases, ―with 
such exceptions and under such regulations as may be provided in 
 
14 See, e.g., Anita Davis, Wallace Jefferson Takes Oath of Office, 64 TEX. B. J. 580, 580 
(2001) (noting that Jefferson was the first African-American judge on the Texas Supreme 
Court); Jefferson Named Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme Court, supra note 8, at 732.  The 
first African American to serve on one of Texas‘ two co-equal supreme courts, the Texas 
Supreme Court, and the Court of Criminal Appeals was Morris Overstreet, who began his 
service on the Court of Criminal Appeals in 1990.  ARIENS, supra note 2, at 210.  In 2002, 
Dale Wainwright, also black, was elected to the Supreme Court of Texas.  Justice Dale 
Wainwright Biography, REELECTDALEWAINWRIGHT.COM, http://www.reelectdalewainwright 
.com/biography (last visited May 15, 2012). 
15 See Chief Justice Wallace B. Jefferson, supra note 1 (noting that Chief Justice Jefferson 
was appointed to the court in 2001); Justices of the Court: The Supreme Court of Texas, supra 
note 2 (showing the years each current justice of the court was appointed, including Justice 
Hecht, appointed in 1988). 
16 TEX. CONST. art. V, § 3(a). 
17 TEX. CONST. art. V, § 6, amended by TEX. CONST. art. V, § 5(a). 
18 See ARIENS, supra note 2, at 55–56; Overruled Their Judicial Superiors, 21 AM. L. REV. 
610, 610–11 (1887). 
19 See Overruled Their Judicial Superiors, supra note 18, at 610 (explaining that the Texas 
Court of Appeals overruled a Supreme Court decision, believing that it was not well-decided 
and was an example of the Supreme Court usurping constitutional authority that it was 
never intended to have). 
20 Fifty-Eighth Day, Thursday, November 1, 1875, in DEBATES IN THE TEXAS 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1875 421, 422 (Seth Shepard McKay ed., 1930); see ARIENS, 
supra note 2, at 48. 
21 ARIENS, supra note 2, at 48; see Overruled Their Judicial Superiors, supra note 18, at 
610–11 (arguing that the creation of the Texas Court of Appeals should have resulted in more 
affirmances of criminal appeals rather than reversals, and that there is ―something strongly 
defective‖ when the opposite result is occurring). 
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this Constitution or as prescribed by law.‖22  The Texas Court of 
Appeals was re-named the Texas Court of Civil Appeals and was 
given jurisdiction to hear and decide initial appeals in civil matters, 
thus partly sheltering the Texas Supreme Court from an avalanche 
of appellate writs.23 
C. Today’s Texas Supreme Court 
The Texas Supreme Court consists of nine Republicans.24  Two of 
its members are African-American, two are Hispanic, including one 
of the court‘s two female members, and five are Anglo.25  Once a 
one-party state in which membership in the Republican Party 
served as a disqualifying factor for those interested in serving in the 
judiciary,26 Texas is presently a one-party state dominated by 
Republicans in state offices.27  Since 1850, with a notable exception 
during Reconstruction,28 all Texas judges are elected, and elected 
 
22 TEX. CONST. art. V, § 5(a). 
23 Id. § 6.  For the text of the amendment, see S.J. Res. 16, 22nd Leg. (Tex. 1891), available 
at http://www.lrl.state.tx.us/scanned/sessionLaws/22-0/SJR_16.pdf, at 198–99.  The 1891 
amendment also failed to meet the goal of clearing the court‘s docket.  By 1915, the court was 
five years behind its docket.  Michael Ariens, The Storm Between the Quiet: Tumult in the 
Texas Supreme Court, 1911–21, 38 ST. MARY‘S L.J. 641, 688–89 (2007). 
24 See Andrew Kreighbaum, One Open Supreme Court Seat, and Six Candidates, TEX. 
TRIB., Feb. 26, 2010, http://www.texastribune.org/texas-courts/texas-supreme-court/one-open-
supreme-court-seat-and-six-candidates/. 
25 See Justices of the Court: The Supreme Court of Texas, supra note 2 (providing profiles 
and pictures of each of the justices of the court). 
26 See Bancroft C. Henderson & T.C. Sinclair, The Selection of Judges in Texas, 5 HOUS. L. 
REV. 430, 467 tbl.14, 468 tbl.15 (1967). 
27 All Texas officials currently serving in statewide political and judicial positions are 
Republicans.  See Ross Ramsey, In Their Election Drought, Texas Democrats Find Solace in 
the G.O.P.’s Past Struggles, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/29/us/ 
politics/texas-democrats-find-solace-in-past-gop-struggles.html (noting that in Texas there 
has not been a statewide elected Democrat since 1994); Statewide Officials, supra note 10 
(listing the current Texas governor, lieutenant governor, attorney general, state comptroller, 
land commissioner, agriculture commissioner, and railroad commissioners as members of the 
Republican National Party); Texas Supreme Court, Leadership Directory, supra note 2 (listing 
the nine justices of the Texas Supreme Court as members and leaders of the Republican 
Party); Political Parties, The One-Party State of Texas?, TEX. POL., 
http://texaspolitics.laits.utexas.edu/4_4_2.html (discussing the rise of the Republican Party in 
Texas).  In a number of pockets in Texas, Democrats control many or all of the local, 
countywide, and regional political and judicial offices.  See People, TEX. DEMOCRATIC PARTY, 
http://www.txdemocrats.org/ (last visited May 15, 2012) (listing the elected democratic 
officials in the Texas House of Representatives, Texas Senate, State Board of Education, 
Court of Appeals, and District Courts); Ramsey, supra (―Some of the state‘s biggest counties—
Dallas, Harris, Travis and Bexar—already elect Democrats to county office, in some cases 
after years of electing Republicans.‖). 
28 HOUSE RESEARCH ORG., TEX. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JUDICIAL SELECTION: 
OPTIONS FOR CHOOSING JUDGES IN TEXAS 1 (1997) [hereinafter TEX. HOUSE OF REPS.], 
available at http://www.hro.house.state.tx.us/focus/jud-sel.pdf. 
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through party affiliation.29 
The last Democratic Party member on the Texas Supreme Court 
was defeated in the November 1998 elections.30  Thus, for over 
thirteen years the Texas Supreme Court has consisted solely of 
Republican Party members.31  This uniformity of party affiliation 
may mean something less than it appears.  When Texas political 
and judicial offices were controlled by members of the Democratic 
Party, factions within the party made for highly contested primary 
elections (most notable, of course, was the 1948 primary race for the 
Democratic Party nomination for Senator between Lyndon Baines 
Johnson and Coke Stevenson).32  Factions within the current 
Republican Party increase the number of contested primary races.33  
Although no current member of the Texas Supreme Court views his 
or her commission in broad, sweeping terms, the limitations of party 
affiliation are found in the number of dissents registered annually 
in the court.34 
The Texas Supreme Court has disposed of between 109 and 164 
causes each year since Jefferson has served as Chief Justice.35  
Similar to many earlier iterations of the court, it has had difficulty 
clearing its docket.36  It was newsworthy that in fiscal year 2009, 
the number of continuing causes was at a nearly-decade low of 
sixty-two.37 
 
29 ARIENS, supra note 2, at 202; Chris Klemme, Jacksonian Justice: The Evolution of the 
Elective Judiciary in Texas, 1836–1850, 105 SW. HIST. Q. 429, 430 (2002) (discussing the rise 
of the popular election of the judiciary in Texas); TEX. HOUSE OF REPS., supra note 28, at 1 
(explaining the rise of the popular election system for judges in Texas). 
30 See ARIENS, supra note 2, at 209–10. 
31 Kreighbaum, supra note 24. 
32 See, e.g., ROBERT A. CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON: MEANS OF ASCENT xxxi–ii, 
265–67 (1990).  See generally Dale Baum & James L. Hailey, Lyndon Johnson’s Victory in the 
1948 Texas Senate Race: A Reappraisal, 109 POL. SCI. Q. 595, 596 (1994) (analyzing the 
victory of Lyndon B. Johnson for the U.S. Senate seat over Coke Stevenson in 1948 when 
Texas was a ―one-party state‖). 
33 See R.A. Dyer, Republicans See More Contested Primary Races, FORT WORTH STAR-
TELEGRAM, Feb. 16, 2006, http://www.redorbit.com/news/politics/394502/republicans_see_ 
more_contested_primary_races/ (discussing the competing factions in the Republican Party in 
2006). 
34 Texas Supreme Court Unofficial Statistics, DOCKETDB.COM, http://docketdb.com/stats 
(last visited May 15, 2012) (listing eighteen dissenting opinions in 2006, eighteen in 2007, 
twenty-nine in 2008, twenty-seven in 2009, twelve in 2010, and twenty-seven in 2011). 
35 CARL REYNOLDS, OFFICE OF COURT ADMIN., ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE TEXAS JUDICIARY: 
FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 25 tbl. (2010). 
36 See id. at 23, 25 (showing that the increases in cases added outnumber the amount 
disposed); see also ARIENS, supra note 2, at 48 (discussing the ―massive‖ number of cases 
pending before the Texas Supreme Court in 1875 and subsequently in 1876, even after the 
court was ―stripped‖ of its ability to hear criminal appeals). 
37 REYNOLDS, supra note 35, at 25. 
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II. CHIEF JUSTICE JEFFERSON‘S OPINIONS 
Chief Justice Jefferson rarely speaks explicitly of his 
jurisprudential views, requiring the inquisitive to construct his 
interpretive manner and style through an evaluation of his implicit 
assumptions.  I will argue that the best evidence of those views is 
found not in his opinions for the court, but in his dissenting and 
concurring opinions.  His opinions for the court, particularly when 
the court is divided, reflect an overriding consideration of the body 
for which he writes.  In majority opinions, the Chief Justice effects 
changes in Texas law incrementally and modestly.  In contrast, his 
concurring and dissenting opinions are free from the constraints of 
representing others.  Those relatively ―free‖ opinions offer some 
insight into Chief Justice Jefferson‘s structural understanding of 
the role of the judiciary in a democratic society. 
My assessment of his work is based on a review of sixty-seven of 
his signed majority opinions,38 twelve concurring opinions,39 and 
nineteen dissenting opinions40 written as Chief Justice through 
2011.  In this essay, I concentrate on his opinions for the court when 
it is substantially divided (in other words, with at least two dissents 
or two concurrences that disagree substantially with the court‘s 
reasoning).41 
 
38 Search Terms in LexisNexis: Texas Federal & State Cases, Combined: 
OPINIONBY(Jefferson) and JUDGES (Jefferson).  The search results were only within the 
specified time period defined above, September 14, 2004 to December 31, 2011.  The members 
of the court are also responsible for per curiam opinions.  BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 1201, 
1251 (9th ed. 2009) (noting that per curiam opinions are decisions authored by an entire 
appellate court as opposed to a single judge).  The court does not reveal the name of the 
technical author of per curiam opinions.  Id. at 1201.  
39 Search Terms in Lexis Nexis: Texas Federal & State Cases, Combined Judge! 
(JEFFERSON) and Dissent! (Jefferson); JUDGE! (Jefferson) and CONCUR! (Jefferson).  The 
search results were only within the specified time period defined above, September 14, 2004 
to December 31, 2011. 
40 Search Terms in Lexis Nexis: Texas Federal & State Cases, Combined Judge! 
(JEFFERSON) and Dissent! (Jefferson); JUDGE! (Jefferson) and CONCUR! (Jefferson).  The 
search results were only within the specified time period defined above, September 14, 2004 
to December 31, 2011.  He has also joined dissenting opinions, written by others in twenty-
seven cases through 2011.  In several cases, the Chief Justice is concurring in part and 
dissenting in part.  I have used my judgment to categorize these opinions as either concurring 
or dissenting opinions. 
41 Chief Justice Jefferson wrote the unanimous opinion (one member did not participate) in 
In re Commitment of Fisher.  164 S.W.3d 637, 639 (Tex. 2005).  The court upheld Texas‘s Civil 
Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators Act against several constitutional challenges.  Id. 
at 639, 644–45, 656.  It held that the statute was civil, not criminal, and therefore a mentally 
incompetent person was not denied due process because the hearing occurred during his 
incompetency.  Id. at 653, 656.  Fisher has been cited favorably by a number of courts in other 
states.  See, e.g., Moore v. Superior Court, 237 P.3d 530, 544 (Cal. 2010); In re Commitment of 
Weekly, 956 N.E.2d 634, 651 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (agreeing with the Texas Supreme Court 
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A. Introduction 
The majority opinions written by Chief Justice Jefferson are 
concentrated in the following subject areas: civil procedure, 
governmental immunity, insurance law, real property (including 
zoning and takings cases), and will/probate cases.42  He has also 
written two majority opinions on the appropriate standards of 
attorney conduct.43  Approximately three-quarters of his majority 
opinions are unanimous or joined by one concurring opinion.44 
The following three subsections address Chief Justice Jefferson‘s 
opinions for the court, in concurrence, and in dissent.45  I reach the 
following conclusions about his work: (1) his opinions reflect a wide 
knowledge of the law.  Most are studded with well-considered 
references to secondary sources, including law review articles, 
treatises, and various restatements of the law, as well as to relevant 
case law from other jurisdictions; (2) he is particular about the 
procedural framework through which the case has reached the 
Texas Supreme Court.  This fastidiousness is not indicative of a 
legal formalism interested solely in the niceties of the law, but of a 
reluctance to overreach.  Any substantive legal conclusions are 
reached only when the case is properly before the court.  His 
reluctance to overreach can lead to a categorical conclusion, a type 
of neo-formalism, largely borne of a respect for the other branches of 
state government.  However, Chief Justice Jefferson‘s jurisprudence 
may best be characterized as consonant with the legal process 
school that flourished in the mid-twentieth century;46 (3) his 
 
that the proceedings were civil in nature and thus no due process violation occurred). 
42 See, e.g., Kirby Lake Dev., Ltd. v. Clear Lake City Water Auth., 320 S.W.3d 829, 832, 
834–35 (Tex. 2010) (governmental immunity and takings); Holmes v. Beatty, 290 S.W.3d 852, 
853 (Tex. 2009) (will/probate law); In re E.A., 287 S.W.3d 1, 2 (Tex. 2009) (civil procedure); 
City of White Settlement v. Super Wash, Inc., 198 S.W.3d 770, 771–72 (Tex. 2006) (zoning 
law); Old Am. Cnty. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Sanchez, 149 S.W.3d 111, 112–13 (Tex. 2004) 
(insurance law). 
43 In addition to Hoover Slovacek LLP v. Walton, 206 S.W.3d 557 (Tex. 2006), discussed 
infra Part II.B and infra text accompanying notes 49–111, the Chief Justice wrote the court‘s 
opinion in Belt v. Oppenheimer, Blend, Harrison & Tate, Inc.  192 S.W.3d 780, 782 (Tex. 2006) 
(holding that a personal representative of an estate may maintain a legal malpractice claim 
on behalf of the estate against decedent‘s estate planners).  Because Texas is one of just nine 
states to hold that a beneficiary of a will or trust may not bring a malpractice claim against 
the attorney who drafted the will or trust, the court‘s decision in Belt was significant.  Id. at 
783. 
44 Search Terms in Lexis Nexis: Texas Federal and State Cases: JUDGE! (Jefferson) AND 
OPINIONBY(Jefferson) (showing seventy-one total opinions authored by Chief Justice 
Jefferson with forty-eight unanimous opinions and five opinions joined by one concurring 
opinion).  The search was limited to September 14, 2004–December 31, 2011. 
45 See infra Part II.B–D. 
46 For an intellectual history of legal process (also called reasoned elaboration), see NEIL 
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opinions for a divided court indicate both a pragmatism and a 
willingness to view the common law more broadly than his 
dissenting colleagues; and (4) his concurring and dissenting 
opinions are fully realized jurisprudential efforts, which prepare a 
path on which a future court may travel. 
B. Majority Opinions 
The number of contested majority opinions written by Chief 
Justice Jefferson were few in number in his first several years on 
the court.  From late 2004–2007, Chief Justice Jefferson wrote the 
majority opinion in cases in which at least two justices dissented 
just four times.47  Of these four cases, the court‘s decision in Hoover 
Slovacek LLP v. Walton generated the most intense and challenging 
dissent.48 
A six-person majority49 held a law firm‘s contingency fee contract 
contrary to public policy because it included a provision that upon 
discharge before termination of the matter, the law firm was 
immediately due ―a fee equal to the present value of the attorney‘s 
interest in the client‘s claim.‖50  Because the payment-upon-
discharge provision was contrary to public policy, it was 
unenforceable.51  The law firm was hired by John B. Walton, Jr. to 
recover unpaid royalties from companies extracting oil and gas from 
Walton‘s 32,500-acre ranch.52  Walton authorized the law firm to 
settle the dispute for $8.5 million.53  The firm‘s initial settlement 
demand in January 1997 was for $58.5 million.54  Opposing counsel 
testified that, after hearing that offer, he ―quit listening.‖55  The 
 
DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 205–99 (1995). 
47 Search Terms in LexisNexis: Texas Federal & State Cases, Combined: 
OPINIONBY(Jefferson) and JUDGE! (Jefferson).  The search was limited to September 14, 
2004–December 31, 2007.  See Walton, 206 S.W.3d at 559, 566; Kroger Tex. Ltd. P‘ship v. 
Suberu, 216 S.W.3d 788, 791, 797 (Tex. 2006); In re Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse of 
McAllen, Inc., 167 S.W.3d 827, 828, 832 (Tex. 2005); J. Hiram Moore, Ltd. v. Greer, 172 
S.W.3d 609, 610, 616 (Tex. 2005). 
48 See Walton, 206 S.W.3d at 566–72 (Hecht, J., dissenting) (providing the dissent of 
Justice Hecht, joined by Justices Medina and Willett); see infra text accompanying notes 79–
108. 
49 See Walton, 206 S.W.3d at 559 (majority opinion) (indicating that the court‘s opinion, 
delivered by Chief Justice Jefferson, was also joined by Justice O‘Neill, Justice Wainwright, 
Justice Brister, Justice Green, and Justice Johnson). 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
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next month, an offer of $6 million was made to Walton‘s attorney; 
an offer that settled all of Walton‘s claims, but also purchased some 
surface estates, acquired easements, and secured Walton‘s 
royalties.56  Walton authorized a settlement of the royalty dispute 
for $6 million, but refused to sell any property.57  In March, Walton 
discharged the law firm.58  His subsequent lawyers settled for 
$900,000.59  Before that settlement, Hoover Slovacek sent Walton a 
bill for $1.7 million (28.66%, the final contingent fee percentage, 
multiplied by $6 million).60  Walton refused to pay Hoover Slovacek, 
and the latter‘s claim was severed from the $900,000 settlement 
and subsequently tried before a jury.61  Walton claimed he 
possessed good cause to fire Hoover Slovacek and that the firm‘s fee 
was unconscionable.  The jury did not find in favor of Walton on 
either claim.62  It ―awarded Hoover $900,000.‖63  The court of 
appeals reversed, holding that the ―fee agreement was 
unconscionable as a matter of law.‖64 
The statement closest to a rhetorical flourish is, ―[i]n Texas, we 
hold attorneys to the highest standards of ethical conduct in their 
dealings with their clients.‖65  The Chief Justice shortly thereafter 
quoted Benjamin Cardozo‘s declaration that a fiduciary ―is held to 
something stricter than the morals of the marketplace.  Not honesty 
alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the 
standard of behavior.‖66  The opinion for the court held that the 
payment-upon-discharge provision violated Texas law on 
compensation for discharged lawyers working on a contingent fee 
basis in several ways: (1) the payment-upon-discharge provision 
violated Texas case law because it imposed an ―undue burden on the 
client‘s ability to change counsel‖;67 (2) prior case law barred an 
attorney receiving compensation pursuant to a contingent fee 
agreement from receiving compensation in excess of the client‘s 
 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 560. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. (footnote omitted). 
63 Id. 
64 Id. (citing Walton v. Hoover, Bax & Slovacek LLP, 149 S.W.3d 834, 837 (Ct. App. Tex. 
2004), rev’d, 206 S.W.3d 557 (Tex. 2006)). 
65 Walton, 206 S.W.3d at 560. 
66 Id. at 561 (quoting Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, C.J.)); 
see also FRED R. SHAPIRO, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LEGAL QUOTATIONS 410 
(1993) (quoting Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 545). 
67 Walton, 206 S.W.3d at 563. 
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―actual recovery‖;68 and (3) the payment-upon-discharge provision 
violated Rule 1.04 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional 
Conduct because it granted the law firm ―a proprietary interest in 
the client‘s claim by entitling him to a percentage of the claim‘s 
value without regard to the ultimate results obtained.‖69 
Although Chief Justice Jefferson only occasionally uses law and 
economics analysis,70 in Walton he also evaluated the manner in 
which the contract allocated risk, and thus incentives, between 
lawyer and client.71  The court noted that the benefits of the 
payment-upon-discharge provision inured to the law firm, while the 
client remained responsible for the accompanying risks.72  The 
contingent fee contract in Walton did not, like most such contracts, 
―encourage[] efficiency and diligent efforts [by the lawyer] to obtain 
the best results possible.‖73  Instead, it created perverse incentives 
for the lawyer to escape the contingency, which increases the 
possibility of ancillary litigation between the client and the 
discharged law firm over the contract.74  Finally, the contingent fee 
agreement failed to state who determined the ―present value of the 
attorney‘s interest in the client‘s claim.‖75  The common law imposed 
upon the attorney the duty to clarify the manner in which the fee 
was to be calculated, and the law firm‘s failure to do so contributed 
to the court‘s legal conclusion that the contract was 
unconscionable.76 
The dissent written by Justice Nathan Hecht, and joined by 
Justices David Medina and Don Willett,77 argues the considerations 
 
68 Id. (quoting Levine v. Bayne, Snell & Krause, Ltd., 40 S.W.3d 92, 95 (Tex. 2001)). 
69 Walton, 206 S.W.3d at 564; see TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.04 
(1984). 
70 But see F.F.P. Operating Partners L.P. v. Duenez, 237 S.W.3d 680, 694 (Tex. 2007) 
(Jefferson, C.J., dissenting) (noting the ―perverse incentive‖ created by a prior decision on the 
Dram Shop Act and concluding the legislature could not have intended it to allow as a defense 
to a civil liability claim made pursuant to the act ―proof that the [bar] made a sale that the 
dram shop statute quite sensibly forbids‖). 
71 Walton, 206 S.W.3d at 561. 
72 Id. at 564. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 559, 565. 
76 The court agreed with the Texas Court of Appeals that Hoover Slovacek failed to present 
evidence of the reasonable value of its services, and thus held no quantum meruit claim 
continued.  Id. at 565–66.  However, Texas law permitted Hoover Slovacek to recover on its 
contract if it was discharged without good cause and the jury held Walton lacked good cause 
to fire the firm.  Id. at 566.  But Walton‘s appeal to the Texas Court of Appeals claimed this 
finding lacked legal and factual sufficiency, a claim the court ignored because it concluded the 
entire fee was unreasonable.  Id. at 565–66.  The matter was thus reversed in part and 
remanded to the court of appeals.  Id. at 566. 
77 Id. (Hecht, J., dissenting). 
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of the court are largely irrelevant or inconsequential.78  Though not 
couched in such terms, the dissent focuses on two factors about 
which it and the court disagree: (1) Contracts between attorneys 
and clients, or at least the contract between sophisticated clients 
such as Walton and Hoover Slovacek, should be read as ordinary 
contracts.79  The court‘s citation to Cardozo‘s demand that the 
fiduciary (attorney) act beyond the morals of the marketplace, with 
a ―punctilio of an honor,‖ is unconvincing to the dissent;80 and (2) 
Walton‘s sophistication should bar the court from concluding that 
provision is unconscionable.81  The possibility that a similar 
contract involving other types of parties was unconscionable was 
insufficient to lead to the court‘s conclusion.82 
The dissent begins by stating that ―[n]o rational plaintiff changes 
lawyers midway through a case in order to recover less, and John B. 
Walton, Jr. was not irrational.‖83  This statement allows the dissent 
to argue that Walton rationally calculated at the time he retained 
the law firm that, if he needed to discharge Hoover Slovacek, ―it 
would be to maximize recovery.‖84  The assumption that Walton was 
a rational maximizer of his needs (a classic first-generation law and 
economics assumption) leads to a second assumption: Walton was 
rationally calculating his economic interests at the time he 
contracted with Hoover Slovacek.85  Those two assumptions lead to 
the conclusion that Walton was able to calculate rationally (and 
compare) the monetary value of the payment-upon-discharge 
provision with existing law providing discharged contingent fee 
lawyers a claim for compensation if discharged without good 
cause.86  In Mandell & Wright v. Thomas, the Texas Supreme Court 
held that a lawyer hired on a contingent fee contract and discharged 
without good cause could recover a fee based on either quantum 
meruit or on the contract itself.87  If the lawyer was discharged for 
good cause, the lawyer was prohibited from suing to collect a fee 
 
78 See id. at 568–70 (listing the dissent‘s summary of the seven reasons the majority gave 
for its decision, which they view as irrelevant and uncertain examples of how the contract 
could possibly be unconscionable under hypothetical circumstances other than the ones 
present in this case). 
79 See id. at 567–68. 
80 See id. at 561, 567–68 (majority opinion) (Hecht, J., dissenting). 
81 See id. at 566 (Hecht, J., dissenting). 
82 See id. at 568, 570. 
83 Id. at 566. 
84 Id. 
85 See id. 
86 Id. at 566–69. 
87 Mandell & Wright v. Thomas, 441 S.W.2d 841, 847 (Tex. 1969). 
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based on the contingent fee contract.88 
What Mandell & Wright did not decide was whether a lawyer 
hired on a contingent fee contract and discharged for good cause 
could collect a fee based on quantum meruit.89  The dissent is well 
aware of the uncertain status of the law.90  In noting the 
possibilities available to Walton when he rationally considered the 
value of the payment-upon-termination provision, the dissent stated 
that if the law firm was discharged for good cause, ―it might have 
the right to be paid the value of its services.‖91  That statement was 
followed by a reference to footnote one.92  Footnote one cited three 
cases, two of which were irrelevant.93  The third cited case, Rocha v. 
Ahmad, was a decision by the Texas Court of Appeals.94  It held a 
lawyer hired on a contingent fee contract and discharged for good 
cause could attempt to recover a fee under quantum meruit.95  If 
Rocha v. Ahmad states the law, then why did the dissent use the 
language, ―might have the right‖?96  It used ―might‖ because the 
Texas Supreme Court has not decided a case similar to Rocha.  And 
since Rocha was decided in 1984,97 the American Law Institute had 
issued its Restatement (Third) of the Law: The Law Governing 
Lawyers.98  In section 40(2) of the Restatement, titled Fees on 
Termination, a lawyer may recover the proportion of compensation 
due the lawyer provided by contract only if ―the discharge or 
withdrawal is not attributable to misconduct of the lawyer.‖99 
Thus, a sophisticated client such as Walton would also have 
known (or been charged with knowing) when the contingent fee 
contract was made that the state of the law regarding fees due upon 
termination for good cause was unclear.100  It was possible that the 
lawyer would receive nothing101 or the full amount of a quantum 
 
88 Walton, 206 S.W.3d at 566–67 (Hecht, J., dissenting). 
89 See Mandell & Wright, 441 S.W.3d at 843, 847. 
90 See Walton, 206 S.W.3d at 568 (Hecht, J., dissenting). 
91 Id. at 566. 
92 Id. at 566–67 & n.1. 
93 Id. at 567 n.1 (citing Royden v. Ardoin, 331 S.W.2d 206, 209 (Tex. 1960); Rocha v. 
Ahmad, 676 S.W.2d 149, 156 (Tex. App. 1984); Kelly v. Murphy, 630 S.W.2d 759, 761–62 (Tex. 
App. 1982)). 
94 Walton, 206 S.W.3d at 567 n.1 (Hecht, J., dissenting) (citing Rocha, 676 S.W.2d 149). 
95 Rocha, 676 S.W.2d at 156 (citing Howell v. Kelly, 534 S.W.2d 737, 739 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1976); Willis & Conner v. Turner, 25 S.W.2d 642, 648 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930)). 
96 Walton, 206 S.W.3d at 566 (Hecht, J., dissenting). 
97 Rocha, 676 S.W.2d at 149. 
98 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW: THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (2000). 
99 Id. § 40(2).  Section 37 of the Restatement declares all or part of a lawyer‘s fee forfeited if 
the lawyer engaged in ―clear and serious violation of duty to a client.‖  Id. § 37. 
100 See Walton, 206 S.W.2d at 566–69 (Hecht, J., dissenting). 
101 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW: THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 40(2) (2000). 
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meruit claim.102  How this legal uncertainty might affect a rational 
maximizer of his own interests seems impossible to say.  The 
dissent concludes that a client and law firm may agree to a 
termination provision ―that avoids wrangling over whether 
discharge was with or without cause, given the intrinsic 
uncertainties in that issue.‖103  This conclusion is true enough, but 
insufficient.  It masks both the disparity in legal knowledge 
between lawyers and the most sophisticated client, and the 
disparity in intensity of desire.  Although a sophisticated client may 
possess the knowledge that discharge for good cause creates the 
possibility of a different measure of damages than a discharge 
without good cause, even the court is uncertain (―might‖) whether 
an attorney discharged for cause may recover on quantum meruit.104 
The dissent twice characterizes the contract as ―fair‖105 and once 
as ―rather innocuous,‖106 on each occasion with little elaboration.  
These conclusions appear premised on the dissent‘s disagreement 
with the court about the role the courts should play in evaluating 
attorney-client contracts.107 
What Hoover Slovacek LLP v. Walton signals is an apparent shift 
in Texas law on attorney fees.108  Mandell & Wright is unusual 
among the states because it allows a discharged lawyer in a 
contingent fee matter to recover on either quantum meruit or on the 
contingent fee contract itself.109  The majority rule limits a lawyer‘s 
recovery to quantum meruit.110  Chief Justice Jefferson‘s opinion for 
the court retains a traditional understanding of the ethical duties a 
lawyer owes her clients.111 
A recent decision written by Chief Justice Jefferson that suggests 
 
102 See Rocha, 676 S.W.2d at 156 (citing Howell v. Kelly, 534 S.W.2d 737, 739 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1976); Willis & Conner v. Turner, 25 S.W.2d 642, 648 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930)). 
103 Walton, 206 S.W.3d at 568 (Hecht, J., dissenting). 
104 See id. at 566. 
105 Id. at 567, 568. 
106 See id. at 567. 
107 See id. at 568, 570. 
108 See Tiffanie S. Clausewitz, Recent Development, On the Trail to Increased Client 
Protection: Attorney Contingent Fee Contract Termination in Light of Hoover v. Walton, 39 ST. 
MARY‘S L.J. 539, 541, 571 (2008). 
109 Mandell & Wright v. Thomas, 441 S.W.2d 841, 847 (Tex. 1969) (internal citations 
omitted); see, e.g., Auguston ex rel. Auguston v. Linea Aerea Nacional-Chile S.A., 76 F.3d 658, 
662–63 n.6 (5th Cir. 1996). 
110 See Rocha v. Ahmad, 676 S.W.2d 149, 156 (Tex. App. 1984) (citing Howell v. Kelly, 534 
S.W.2d 737, 739 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976); Willis & Conner v. Turner, 25 S.W.2d 642, 648 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1930)); see also Auguston, 76 F.3d at 663 n.6 (stating that the majority of 
jurisdictions limit the lawyer‘s ―recovery to quantum meruit‖). 
111 See Walton, 206 S.W.3d at 560–61 (quoting Lopez v. Muñoz, Hockema & Reed, L.L.P., 
22 S.W.3d 857, 866–68 (Tex. 2000)). 
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a significant shift in Texas law is Sharyland Water Supply Corp. v. 
City of Alton.112  Sharyland Water Supply Corporation is a non-
profit corporation that supplies water to the residents of Alton and 
elsewhere.113  In a water supply agreement with the city of Alton, 
Sharyland agreed to supply potable water to the city‘s residents, 
and in exchange was given title to the existing Alton water 
system.114  In the 1990s, Alton hired several companies to build a 
sewer system.115  According to Sharyland, part of the sewer system 
was negligently constructed, causing harm to Sharyland.116  This 
negligence, Sharyland claimed, breached its agreement with the city 
of Alton, and it won a verdict of over one million dollars.117  The 
court of appeals held that Sharyland‘s negligence claim was barred 
by the economic loss rule.118  This rule, in general, states that a 
party that suffers only a pecuniary loss due to negligence by 
another may not recover in some tort law claims.119 
In a careful review of Texas precedents, Chief Justice Jefferson 
noted that the economic loss rule had been applied ―only in cases 
involving defective products or failure to perform a contract.‖120  It 
had never applied the rule more broadly as prohibiting the recovery 
of economic damages in a tort claim.121  Chief Justice Jefferson then 
took an approach he has regularly applied in his opinions: he 
avoided deciding issues that the court did not need to decide.  The 
extent to which the economic loss rule applied was irrelevant to 
resolving the case ―because the court of appeals [had] erred in 
concluding that Sharyland‘s water system [in Alton] had not been 
damaged.‖122  Because the water system had once conformed to 
state law and now did not, Sharyland was required by its agreement 
with Alton to remedy this compliance failure.123  That meant 
 
112 Sharyland Water Supply Corp. v. City of Alton, 354 S.W.3d 407, 409 (Tex. 2011). 
113 Id. at 410. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. (citing City of Alton v. Sharyland Water Supply Corp., 277 S.W.3d 132, 139 (Tex. 
App. 2009)). 
116 Sharyland, 354 S.W.3d at 410 (citing City of Alton, 277 S.W.3d at 140). 
117 Sharyland, 354 S.W.3d at 411. 
118 Id. (citing City of Alton, 277 S.W.3d at 155). 
119 See generally Vincent R. Johnson, The Boundary-Line Function of the Economic Loss 
Rule, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 523, 525–26 (2009) (stating that one cannot recover economic 
losses in a negligence suit without a showing of personal or property damage).  As the court 
notes, several economic loss rules exist, not just one.  See Sharyland, 354 S.W.3d at 415 
(quoting Johnson, supra, at 534–35). 
120 Sharyland, 354 S.W.3d at 418. 
121 See id. 
122 Id. at 420 (citing City of Alton, 277 S.W.3d at 154). 
123 Sharyland, 354 S.W.3d at 420. 
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expending significant funds, for which the jury awarded damages.124 
Since 2008, Chief Justice Jefferson has written several majority 
opinions for the court from which two or more justices either 
dissented or merely concurred with the majority opinion, including 
three 2011 opinions in which the court split five–four.125  These 
cases often raise issues of first impression and, more importantly, 
raise issues of the court‘s role in interpreting statutes, regulations, 
and the path of the common law.  Many of these cases contain 
substantial procedural components, while others require close 
statutory and constitutional interpretation. 
In In re Brookshire Grocery Co.,126 Badiga v. Lopez,127 In re 
E.A.,128 University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center at Dallas 
v. Estate of Arancibia ex rel. Vasquez-Arancibia,129 and Texas A & M 
University-Kingsville v. Yarbrough,130 Chief Justice Jefferson writes 
an opinion for the court concerning aspects of the law of civil 
procedure and practice, both court-generated rules of civil procedure 
and statutes regulating the civil process.131  In each case at least 
two justices dissented from or merely concurred with the court‘s 
holding.132  Chief Justice Jefferson‘s opinions are written in a clear, 
concise, and uncluttered fashion, and exemplify his approach to the 
structural role of the courts. 
 
124 Id. 
125 Search Terms in LexisNexis: Texas Federal & State Cases, Combined: 
OPINIONBY(Jefferson) and JUDGE! (Jefferson).  The search was limited to January 1, 2008–
December 31, 2011.  See, e.g., Tex. A & M Univ.-Kingsville v. Yarbrough, 347 S.W.3d 289, 
289, 292 (Tex. 2011) (dividing the justices in a five–four vote); Tex. Dep‘t of Pub. Safety v. Cox 
Tex. Newspapers L.P., 343 S.W.3d 112, 113, 121 (Tex. 2011) (splitting the justices in a five–
four vote); City of Dall. v. Stewart, No. 09-0257, 2011 WL 2586882, at *1, *13 (Tex. July 1, 
2011), withdrawn, 361 S.W.3d 563 (Tex. 2012) (splitting the justices in a five–four vote); City 
of Dall. v. VSC, LLC, 347 S.W.3d 231, 233, 240 (Tex. 2011); Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts 
v. Attorney Gen. of Tex., 354 S.W.3d 336, 337, 349 (Tex. 2010); Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. at 
Dall. v. Estate of Arancibia ex rel. Vasquez-Arancibia, 324 S.W.3d 544, 546, 552 (Tex. 2010); 
In re E.A., 287 S.W.3d 1, 2, 6 (Tex. 2009); Badiga v. Lopez, 274 S.W.3d 681, 682, 685 (Tex. 
2009); Fed. Ins. Co. v. Samsung Electronics Am., 268 S.W.3d 506, 507–08 (Tex. 2008); Zurich 
Am. Ins. Co. v. Nokia, Inc., 268 S.W.3d 487, 488, 501–02 (Tex. 2008); In re Brookshire Grocery 
Co., 250 S.W.3d 66, 73 (Tex. 2008). 
126 In re Brookshire Grocery Co., 250 S.W.3d at 66. 
127 Badiga, 274 S.W.3d at 681. 
128 In re E.A., 287 S.W.3d at 1. 
129 Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. at Dall., 324 S.W.3d at 544. 
130 Tex. A & M Univ.-Kingsville, 347 S.W.3d at 289. 
131 Id. at 290; Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. at Dall., 324 S.W.3d at 547–52 (discussing a 
party‘s right to interlocutory appeal and the notice requirements when a potential claim 
against the government is to be filed); In re E.A., 287 S.W.3d at 2; Badiga, 274 S.W.3d at 682; 
In re Brookshire Grocery Co., 250 S.W.3d at 67. 
132 Tex. A & M Univ.-Kingsville, 347 S.W.3d at 289, 292; Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. at 
Dall., 324 S.W.3d at 546, 552; In re E.A., 287 S.W.3d at 2, 6; Badiga, 274 S.W.3d at 682, 685; 
In re Brookshire Grocery Co., 250 S.W.3d at 66, 73. 
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Brookshire Grocery concerned whether the plenary power of the 
trial court had already expired when it granted the defendant‘s 
motion for a new trial.133  Brookshire Grocery was a defendant in a 
tort action.134  The jury issued a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.135  
Before the trial court issued its judgment, the Grocery moved for 
―Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and in the Alternative 
Motion for New Trial.‖136  The trial court issued judgment for the 
plaintiff and a day later signed an order denying both the motion for 
a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and the motion for a new 
trial.137  ―On January 7, 2005, twenty-nine days after [the] 
judgment‖ was signed, Brookshire Grocery filed a motion for a new 
trial.138  This motion was granted by the trial court on February 
1.139  The issue was whether Brookshire‘s January 7 motion for a 
new trial was filed in a timely manner as required by Texas Rule of 
Civil Procedure 329b(e).140  If the motion was not filed in a timely 
manner, the court‘s plenary power to grant a new trial had 
expired.141  Chief Justice Jefferson‘s opinion for the court held the 
January 7 motion was not timely filed.142  It noted that Rule 329b(b) 
allowed an amended motion for a new trial if (1) ―no preceding 
motion for a new trial had been overruled,‖ and (2) the motion was 
filed thirty days before judgment.143  Chief Justice Jefferson‘s 
opinion additionally noted ―‗[a]nd‘ is conjunctive.‖144  Because the 
trial court had denied a prior motion for a new trial, Brookshire 
could meet only the second element of the test of the Rule.145 
In reaching its conclusion, the court looked at the history of the 
Rule, particularly the reason for its amendment in 1981, and noted 
several options available to counsel even after a motion for a new 
trial had been denied.146  The court‘s opinion also responded to the 
dissent‘s claim that the motion should have been understood as a 
motion to modify the judgment.147  The court noted the caption of 
 
133 In re Brookshire Grocery Co., 250 S.W.3d at 67. 
134 Id. at 68. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 69; see TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(e). 
141 In re Brookshire Grocery Co., 250 S.W.3d at 69. 
142 Id. at 72. 
143 Id. at 69.  
144 Id.  
145 Id. at 72. 
146 See id. at 70–72. 
147 Id. at 72–73. 
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the motion and the relief requested both asked for a new trial.148  
Finally, the court explained that conflating a motion for a new trial 
with a motion to modify, correct, or reform a judgment, did violence 
to the structure and text of the Rules of Civil Procedure.149  Not only 
did Rule 329b treat a motion for a new trial differently than a 
motion to modify, correct, or reform a judgment, Rule 5‘s limitations 
on the length of time trial courts possessed to take action were 
evaded if the dissent‘s approach were adopted.150  This was not, as 
claimed by the dissent, merely one of those ―meaningless 
technicalities‖ of civil procedure that invoked a mindless 
formalism.151 
In an underlying medical malpractice action, the issue before the 
court was an interpretation of a provision of the Civil Practices and 
Remedies Code concerning when a medical provider may prosecute 
an interlocutory appeal.152  As part of its alteration of the rules of 
medical malpractice actions, the Texas legislature required a 
medical malpractice plaintiff to submit an expert report to the 
defendant within 120 days after suit is filed.153  The trial court 
―must grant‖ a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff failed to file a 
report.154  If a report is filed in a timely fashion but is deficient, the 
trial court may grant one thirty-day extension.155  In the former 
case, the failure by the trial court to grant the motion to dismiss 
could be appealed immediately, but a decision to grant a thirty-day 
extension was not subject to an interlocutory appeal.156  In Badiga 
v. Lopez, the plaintiff failed to timely serve defendant an expert 
report.157  The defendant moved to dismiss.158  The district court 
denied the motion to dismiss and at the same time granted plaintiff 
a thirty-day extension to file the expert report.159  The defendant 
then filed an interlocutory appeal.160  The court held that, when no 
expert report had been made, the decisions to deny the motion to 
dismiss and to grant the extension were separable, and thus the 
 
148 Id. 
149 See id. at 73. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. at 78 (Hecht, J., dissenting). 
152 Badiga v. Lopez, 274 S.W.3d 681, 682–83 (Tex. 2009); see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE 
ANN. § 74.351(b) (West 2012). 
153 Badiga, 274 S.W.3d at 683. 
154 Id. at 682. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. at 682–83. 
158 Id. at 682. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
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appellate court possessed jurisdiction to hear and decide the appeal 
of the order denying the motion to dismiss.161 
A year earlier, the court had held a decision of the trial court to 
deny a motion to dismiss and grant a thirty-day extension to cure a 
deficient, but timely, expert report unappealable.  The dissent, 
noting this decision,162 argued that the statute‘s plain reading 
applied to all orders granting extensions of time.163  The court‘s 
response was to look at the purpose of the statute.164  The reason for 
a ban on interlocutory appeals of a denial of a motion to dismiss 
when a thirty-day extension is granted to cure a deficient report is 
judicial efficiency.165  The only reason to ban appeals when no 
expert report is served is to give the plaintiff additional time, 
unreviewable by an appellate court, which harms the interests of 
defendants.166 
Chief Justice Jefferson‘s opinion for the court in In re E.A. also 
addressed an amended civil procedure provision.167  Emilio, the 
father of two minor children, petitioned the district court to modify 
the order granting the mother, Norma, the exclusive right to 
determine the children‘s primary residence.168  The parties agreed 
that Norma had received notice of this petition.169  Emilio later filed 
an amended petition demanding more relief.170  The amended 
petition lacked a certificate of service, but Emilio claimed he sent 
Norma the petition via certified mail, as permitted by amended 
Rule 21a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.171  After three 
attempts, the post office was unable to deliver the certified 
petition.172  After Emilio was granted a default judgment, ―Norma 
moved to set aside the default judgment‖ and requested other 
relief.173  ―The trial court denied [the] motions‖ and ―[t]he court of 
appeals affirmed.‖174  The supreme court held the father failed to 
 
161 Id. at 685. 
162 Id. at 686 (Brister, J., dissenting) (citing Ogletree v. Matthews, 262 S.W.3d 316, 321 
(Tex. 2007)). 
163 See Badiga, 274 S.W.3d at 686. 
164 See id. at 684.  
165 See id. 
166 See id. (―The purpose of the ban on interlocutory appeals for extensions is to allow 
plaintiffs the opportunity to cure defects in existing reports.‖). 
167 In re E.A., 287 S.W.3d 1, 2 (Tex. 2009); see TEX. R. CIV. P. 21a. 
168 In re E.A., 287 S.W.3d at 2. 
169 Id. at 3. 
170 Id. at 2–3. 
171 Id. at 3. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. 
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serve notice in compliance with Rule 21a and concluded the record 
was insufficient to find constructive notice existed.175  In reaching 
this conclusion, the court decided that notice in compliance with 
Rule 21a would be sufficient, altering Texas case law that required 
an additional citation upon filing an amended petition for more 
onerous relief.176 
In University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center at Dallas v. 
Estate of Arancibia ex rel. Vasquez-Arancibia, the issue was 
whether the defendant medical center, a governmental entity, was 
given timely notice of a medical malpractice claim.177  This required 
the court to determine whether a 2005 statute, amending the 
Government Code to make all prerequisites to suit jurisdictional, 
applied to the case, which arose before the amendment.178  If the 
amendment applied, the court next had to determine whether the 
defendant received actual notice of the claim.179  The court carefully 
assessed the reasons to apply the statute retroactively, and held it 
should be so applied.180  It then held that the defendant medical 
center had received actual notice of the claim as required under the 
Texas Tort Claims Act.181  The Chief Justice‘s opinion noted that the 
Government Code did not require formal notice under the Tort 
Claims Act if it received ―actual notice that death has occurred.‖182  
Looking pragmatically at the evidence, the majority held the 
defendant ―was subjectively aware of its fault.‖183  The court noted 
the dissent‘s more stringent interpretation of actual notice would 
require ―an unqualified confession of fault,‖ a standard that would 
conflate an admission of liability with a claim of liability made by a 
plaintiff.184  The court further noted that requiring formal notice to 
protect governmental entities from unfounded claims would add 
nothing to the actual notice already possessed by the defendant.185 
The most recent contested procedural opinion written by Chief 
 
175 Id. at 5–6. 
176 Id. at 6 (―Service of new citation is no longer required.‖). 
177 Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. at Dall. v. Estate of Arancibia ex rel. Vasquez-Arancibia, 
324 S.W.3d 544, 546 (Tex. 2010) (granting petition for review to determine if the plaintiffs 
provided timely notice to the hospital regarding their medical malpractice claim). 
178 Id. at 546–47; see TEX. GOV. CODE ANN. § 311.034 (West 2012). 
179 See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. at Dall., 324 S.W.3d at 547. 
180 See id. at 547–48 (relying on the fact that retroactive application of a jurisdictional rule 
impacts a court‘s right to hear a case and not substantive rights). 
181 Id. at 548–50 (reasoning that a subjective awareness of fault constitutes actual notice 
in this case); see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.101(c) (West 2012). 
182 Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. at Dall., 324 S.W.3d at 548 (quoting § 101.101(c)). 
183 Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. at Dall., 324 S.W.3d at 549. 
184 See id. at 550. 
185 Id. 
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Justice Jefferson is Texas A & M University-Kingsville v. 
Yarbrough.186  The issue was whether Yarbrough‘s legal claim, that 
a dismissal by the university of her grievance violated her rights 
under the Government Code, was moot.187  Yarbrough, then an 
untenured professor, filed a grievance contesting a negative 
performance evaluation, an evaluation that would be used in part to 
determine whether she would be awarded tenure.188  Yarbrough was 
subsequently awarded tenure.189  She continued to press her claim 
on the ground that the failure by the university to change its 
grievance policies was a continuing violation of her right to present 
grievances.190  The court held the controversy moot, finding no 
exceptions to the doctrine allowing her case to survive.191  The court 
rejected the dissent‘s claim that, because the negative performance 
evaluation remained in her employment file, Yarbrough continued 
to suffer collateral legal consequences.192  The dissent‘s conclusion 
exempted the suit from the mootness doctrine.193  The possibility of 
―unspecified future harm‖ was insufficient to mean a ―substantial 
controversy‖ existed.194 
Ockham‘s Razor is a famous ―principle of parsimony‖ in the 
history of philosophy.195  Chief Justice Jefferson, who majored in 
philosophy,196 is both undoubtedly aware of Ockham‘s Razor and an 
apparent believer in its application in law.  Ockham‘s Razor 
suggests that persons should prefer a simpler explanation to a more 
complicated explanation.197  His procedural opinions exemplify 
Ockham‘s Razor: cutting to the heart of the issue, avoiding needless 
digressions into matters not before the court, and interpreting 
 
186 Tex. A & M Univ.-Kingsville v. Yarbrough, 347 S.W.3d 289, 289 (Tex. 2011). 
187 See id. at 289–90 (concluding that there was no live controversy because the professor 
was granted tenure before filing suit); see also TEX. GOV‘T. CODE ANN. § 617.005 (West 2012) 
(concluding that a collective bargaining chapter in the Government Code ―does not impair‖ 
the privilege of public workers to file grievances). 
188 Tex. A & M Univ.-Kingsville, 347 S.W.3d at 289–90. 
189 Id. at 290. 
190 Id. 
191 See id. at 290–91 (holding that no exception to the mootness doctrine existed because 
the court found no evidence that Yarbrough would be precluded from seeking review of the 
policy in the future and no showing that the duration of the policy is not so short as to 
preclude review before the issue becomes moot, nor did the court find evidence that 
Yarbrough would again receive negative evaluations). 
192 Id. at 291. 
193 See id. 
194 Id. (quoting Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941)). 
195 ROBERT C. SOLOMON & KATHLEEN M. HIGGINS, A SHORT HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 149 
(1996). 
196 Priestner, supra note 4, at 406. 
197 SOLOMON & HIGGINS, supra note 195, at 149. 
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statutes and rules both plainly and purposively.  In addition, the 
Chief Justice‘s procedural opinions avoid party or issue bias.  The 
substantive issue in three of these five procedural cases is a tort 
claim,198 and the Texas Supreme Court has been attacked as biased 
in favor of tort defendants.199  These opinions are studiously 
indifferent to the underlying substantive claim, a measure of the 
Chief Justice‘s concern with effectuating the reasons for procedural 
rules.  His opinions avoid both the fetish of legal formalism and the 
flabbiness of some forms of legal realism. 
Two additional sets of majority opinions written by Chief Justice 
Jefferson also deserve some attention.  In 2011, the court decided 
two takings decisions,200 and two opinions balancing claims of 
individual privacy with disclosure of information of some public 
import.201 
In City of Dallas v. Stewart,202 following approximately seven 
months after the decision in City of Dallas v. VSC, LLC,203 a divided 
court considered the processes by which the propriety of 
constitutional takings claims were adjudged.204  In Stewart, the 
court held that using an administrative board to make ―essentially 
conclusive‖ judgments about a takings claim failed to properly 
balance a person‘s constitutional right to property with the city‘s 
interest in abating a nuisance.205  In VSC, LLC, a divided court held 
a company‘s decision to sue rather than use a statutory remedy to 
petition for the return of their claimed property left the trial court 
 
198 See, e.g., Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. at Dall. v. Estate of Arancibia ex rel. Vasquez-
Arancibia, 324 S.W.3d 544, 546, 550 (Tex. 2010) (medical malpractice tort claim); Badiga v. 
Lopez, 274 S.W.3d 681, 682 (Tex. 2009) (medical malpractice tort claim); In re Brookshire 
Grocery Co., 250 S.W.3d 66, 68 (Tex. 2008) (tort action). 
199 See, e.g., David A. Anderson, Judicial Tort Reform in Texas, 26 REV. LITIG. 1, 4–42 
(2007) (attributing tort defendant victories to judges holding that there is no evidence to 
support a plaintiff‘s verdict, judges adopting procedural rules that benefit defendants, and 
judges interpreting statutes in favor of defendants); Caleb Rackley, A Survey of Sea-Change 
on the Supreme Court of Texas and Its Turbulent Toll on Texas Tort Law, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 
733, 735 (2007) (noting that until the 1970s tort law in Texas was skewed to the defendants). 
200 City of Dall. v. Stewart, No. 09-0257, 2011 WL 2586882, at *2–4 (Tex. July 1, 2011), 
withdrawn, 361 S.W.3d 562 (Tex. 2012) (real property takings decision); City of Dall. v. VSC, 
LLC, 347 S.W.3d 231, 233–34 (Tex. 2011) (motor vehicle takings decision).   
201 See Tex. Dep‘t. of Pub. Safety v. Cox Tex. Newspapers, L.P., 343 S.W.3d 112, 113 (Tex. 
2011) (concerning the disclosure of a governor‘s travel expense vouchers); Tex. Comptroller of 
Pub. Accounts v. Attorney Gen. of Tex., 354 S.W.3d 336, 337–38 (Tex. 2010) (regarding the 
privacy rights implicated in the disclosure of a state employee‘s date of birth). 
202 The court denied a motion for rehearing and substituted its July opinion for an opinion 
released on January 27, 2012.  Stewart, 361 S.W.3d at 562. 
203 See id. at 563 (deciding the case on January 27, 2012); VSC, LLC, 347 S.W.3d at 231 
(deciding the case on July 1, 2011). 
204 See Stewart, 361 S.W.3d at 562. 
205 Id. 
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without jurisdiction to hear the claim.206 
Heather Stewart bought a house in the city of Dallas, and 
abandoned it in 1991.207  In 2002, the city demolished the house.208  
In the interim, Dallas Code Enforcement personnel regularly visited 
the house.209  After a hearing before the Dallas Urban 
Rehabilitation Standards Board, the board found the house was an 
―urban nuisance.‖210  It denied Stewart‘s request for a rehearing, 
reaffirming its initial order.211  Approximately one month later, 
after a Dallas inspector found Stewart‘s property had not been 
repaired, the city obtained a demolition warrant from a judge, and 
the house was demolished shortly thereafter.212 
Stewart appealed the decision of the Board to a district court, but 
that ―appeal did not stay the demolition order.‖213  After demolition, 
she claimed the city had unconstitutionally taken her property.214  
The district court ordered a jury trial on the takings claim, and the 
jury found that Stewart‘s house was not a public nuisance and 
awarded her over $75,000.215  The City appealed, claiming the 
board‘s decision that the house was a nuisance precluded any 
contrary finding by a jury.216 
The court, noting that ―[t]akings suits are thus, fundamentally, 
constitutional suits and must ultimately be decided by a court 
rather than an agency,‖ held ―that this ―matter of constitutional 
right may [not] finally rest with a panel of citizens untrained in 
constitutional law.‖217 
In City of Dallas v. VSC, LLC, issued on July 1, 2011,218 the court 
dismissed a constitutional takings claim by VSC, which sued 
claiming the City had taken motor vehicles in which VSC possessed 
an ownership interest.219  According to VSC, the City of Dallas 
―seized 326 vehicles . . . from VSC, a licensed vehicle storage 
facility.‖220  Police officers testified that all of the confiscated 
 
206 VSC, LLC, 347 S.W.3d at 233. 
207 Stewart, 361 S.W.3d at 563. 
208 Id. 
209 Id. 
210 Id. 
211 Id. 
212 Id. 
213 Id. 
214 Id. 
215 Id. 
216 Id. at 565. 
217 Id. at 565, 567. 
218 City of Dall. v. VSC, LLC, 347 S.W.3d 231, 231 (Tex. 2011). 
219 Id. at 233. 
220 Id. at 233–34. 
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vehicles were either stolen or displayed some indicia that they had 
been stolen.221  For forty-seven of the vehicles, VSC pursued its 
statutory remedy in municipal court.222  For the other vehicles, 
instead of pursuing its statutory remedy, VSC sued, claiming an 
unconstitutional taking.223 Stewart had held the Texas 
Constitution‘s Takings Clause self-executing.224  Why was VSC 
barred from asserting its constitutional claim rather than the 
statutory remedy available to it?225  The court first noted ―[t]he 
[l]egislature‘s broad authority to prescribe . . . remedies for takings‖ 
claims, an authority subject only to constitutional requirements 
such as due process.226  VSC claimed that the statutory remedy did 
not provide it with due process because the city is not required to 
notify claimants of those proceedings.227  Relying on a 1999 decision 
of the Supreme Court of the United States, the court held that VSC 
possessed actual notice of the seizure of the vehicles, notice that was 
constitutionally sufficient because that remedial procedure was 
―easily discoverable.‖228 
The same five justices who formed the majority in the five-to-four 
decision in Stewart229 were joined by Justice Paul Green.230  A 
lengthy and thorough dissent by Justice Dale Wainwright argued in 
part that the government failed to provide notice to VSC of its 
disposal of the vehicles, which violated VSC‘s rights.231 
The Texas Supreme Court has also recently issued two important 
opinions balancing a person‘s right to privacy with the public‘s 
interest in information about public employees, both written by 
Chief Justice Jefferson.232  In Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts 
 
221 Id. at 234. 
222 Id. at 235. 
223 Id. 
224 City of Dall. v. Stewart, 361 S.W.3d 562, 567 (Tex. 2012) (citing Steele v. City of Hous., 
603 S.W.2d 786, 791 (Tex. 1980)); see TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 17. 
225 See City of Dall. v. VSC, LLC, 347 S.W.3d 231, 233 (Tex. 2011) (precluding the 
constitutional claim). 
226 Id. at 236. 
227 Id. at 238. 
228 Id. at 238–39 (citing City of W. Covina v. Perkins, 525 U.S. 234, 241 (1999)). 
229 Stewart, 361 S.W.3d at 563 (noting that the majority consisted of Chief Justice 
Jefferson and Justices Hecht, Medina, Willett, and Lehrmann). 
230 VSC, LLC, 347 S.W.3d at 233 (adding Justices to the same Justices that formed the 
majority in Stewart, which were Chief Justice Jefferson and Justices Hecht, Medina, Willett, 
and Lehrmann). 
231 Id. at 255 (Wainwright, J., dissenting). 
232 TEX. GOV‘T CODE ANN. § 552.001 (West 2004).  The court also interpreted the Texas 
Public Information Act in City of Dallas v. Abbott, 304 S.W.3d 380, 381 (Tex. 2010).  In that 
6–2 decision, written by Justice O‘Neill and joined by Chief Justice Jefferson, the court 
evaluated the timeliness of a governmental entity‘s request for an opinion from the attorney 
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v. Attorney General of Texas233 and Texas Department of Public 
Safety v. Cox Texas Newspapers, L.P.,234 the court interpreted the 
state‘s Public Information Act in ways that are less persuasive than 
the approach taken by the dissents.235 
In both cases, media companies made a request for government 
information.236 Under Texas‘s Public Information Act, a 
presumption favors disclosure of the requested information.237  In 
both cases the Texas Supreme Court held that the requested 
information (or at least some of the requested information) did not 
have to be disclosed.238  Both opinions are defensible but ultimately 
unpersuasive. 
In Texas Comptroller, the Dallas Morning News sought a copy of 
the Texas Comptroller‘s payroll database.239  The Comptroller 
provided all the information found in the database other than the 
dates of birth of the employees.240  It withheld date of birth 
information based on section 552.101 of the Texas Government 
Code, which exempted from disclosure ―information considered to be 
confidential by law, either constitutional, statutory, or by judicial 
decision.‖241 Under section 552.102 of the Government Code, 
―information in a personnel file, the disclosure of which would 
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy‖ is 
also exempted from disclosure.242  The Comptroller then requested 
an opinion from the Attorney General asking whether she was 
 
general.  Id.  It held that ―timeliness . . . is measured from the date a party seeking public 
information responds to a governmental body‘s good-faith request for clarification or 
narrowing of an unclear or overbroad information request.‖  Id.  Justice Wainwright also 
dissented in Abbott, concluding that, because the Public Information Act stated that a 
governmental entity had ten days to request an opinion from the attorney general once the 
request was ―received,‖ a conclusion that the ten-day window did not begin until the request 
was ―clarified‖ was contrary to the Act.  Id. at 388 (Wainwright, J., dissenting); see TEX. GOV‘T 
CODE ANN. § 552.301 (West 2012). 
233 Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts v. Att‘y Gen. of Tex., 354 S.W.3d 336 (Tex. 2010) 
(reh’g denied, Jan. 14, 2011). 
234 Tex. Dep‘t of Pub. Safety v. Cox Tex. Newspapers, L.P., 343 S.W.3d 112 (Tex. 2011). 
235 Id. at 113–14 (interpreting the state‘s Public Information Act to determine whether it 
requires the production of travel vouchers for Governor Rick Perry‘s security detail even if it 
would put the governor in danger); Tex. Comptroller, 354 S.W.3d at 337–38 (deciding whether 
the Public Information Act requires disclosure of the birth dates of the state employees to the 
Dallas Morning News or whether this infringes on the employees‘ privacy rights). 
236 Cox Tex. Newspapers, 343 S.W.3d at 113 (requesting production of travel vouchers for 
Governor Rick Perry‘s security detail); Tex. Comptroller, 354 S.W.3d at 337 (showing that the 
Dallas Morning News requested the birth dates of all state employees). 
237 TEX. GOV‘T CODE ANN. § 552.001(b) (West 2004). 
238 Cox Tex. Newspapers, 343 S.W.3d at 120; Tex. Comptroller, 354 S.W.3d at 338. 
239 Tex. Comptroller, 354 S.W.3d at 337. 
240 Id. 
241 Id. (citing TEX. GOV‘T CODE ANN. § 552.101 (West 2011)). 
242 TEX. GOV‘T CODE ANN. § 552.101. 
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required to disclose the dates of birth of state employees.243  The 
Attorney General concluded Texas law prohibited the Comptroller 
from withholding information about employees‘ dates of birth.244  
The Comptroller was then in the unusual position of suing the 
Attorney General, while being represented by the Attorney 
General.245  The Morning News intervened.246  The district court 
and the court of appeals both held in favor of disclosure.247 
On appeal to the Texas Supreme Court, the Comptroller 
reiterated her initial position that section 552.101 exempted birth 
dates from disclosure.248  As was made clear by the dissent, the 
Comptroller expressly disclaimed any reliance on section 552.102.249  
Even so, the court, twice claiming the existence of ―unique 
circumstances,‖ held the Comptroller properly withheld date of 
birth information under section 552.102.250 
Chief Justice Jefferson‘s argument is sophisticated but ultimately 
unpersuasive.  He first noted that the state‘s employees possess a 
common law privacy interest as third parties, an interest that must 
be acknowledged by the court.251  Though the Comptroller did not 
justify her actions under the personnel file exemption of section 
552.102, the interests of those third parties plus the unique 
circumstances of the case led the Texas Supreme Court to expand 
the Comptroller‘s petition to include a section 552.102 argument.252 
Section 552.102 stated personnel information that ―would 
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy‖ was 
exempt from disclosure.253  This particular language, the court 
noted, was identical to language in the federal government‘s 
Freedom of Information Act‘s (―FOIA‖) exemption 6.254  That FOIA 
exemption was interpreted by the Supreme Court in Department of 
the Air Force v. Rose as creating a balancing test weighing an 
 
243 Tex. Comptroller, 354 S.W.3d at 337 (Tex. 2010) (citing TEX. GOV‘T CODE ANN. § 
552.301). 
244 Tex. Comptroller, 354 S.W.3d at 338. 
245 Id. at 338–39. 
246 Id. at 339. 
247 Id. at 338. 
248 Id. at 351 (Wainwright, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citing TEX. GOV‘T 
CODE ANN. § 552.101). 
249 Tex. Comptroller, 354 S.W.3d at 350–51 (citing TEX. GOV‘T CODE ANN. §§ 552.101–02). 
250 Tex. Comptroller, 354 S.W.3d at 338, 340 (majority opinion). 
251 Id. at 339–41 (citing TEX. GOV‘T CODE ANN. § 552.102) (holding that TEX. GOV‘T CODE 
ANN. § 552.102 extends privacy protection to state employees as third parties). 
252 Tex. Comptroller, 354 S.W.3d at 339–41. 
253 Id. at 338 (quoting TEX. GOV‘T CODE ANN. § 552.102). 
254 Tex. Comptroller, 354 S.W.3d at 340–42 (citing Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 
552(b)(6) (West 2012); TEX. GOV‘T CODE ANN. § 552.102). 
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individual‘s right of privacy with the public‘s interest in information 
about the workings of the government.255  The court then held that, 
though a ―balancing test is not required under section 552.101,‖ 
because the Texas Public Information Act was ―modeled‖ on the 
FOIA, it would adopt federal precedent and use the Rose balancing 
test to interpret section 552.102.256 
In weighing this balance, the court found the privacy interests of 
the employees ―significant‖ while concluding the public interest in 
employees‘ birth dates was ―minimal.‖257  The disclosure of birth 
dates enhanced the possibility of identity theft, which the court 
declared, ―is becoming one of the fastest growing criminal and 
consumer offenses in the twenty-first century.‖258  Similarly, if birth 
dates were disclosed, they would be disclosed, like the other 
information given to the Dallas Morning News, in a searchable 
form, increasing the possibility of identity theft.259  The court then 
made a logical leap: because the legislature statutorily exempted 
from disclosure employees‘ social security numbers, home 
addresses, and personal family information, the failure of the court 
to exempt birth dates would render ―meaningless‖ those statutory 
exemptions ―because those dates, when combined with name and 
place of birth, can reveal social security numbers.‖260  The court 
then cited to a story in the very same Dallas Morning News on the 
insecurity of social security numbers.261  Thus, the privacy interests 
of the employees were substantial.262 
In contrast, the court concluded that the disclosure of birth dates 
―reveal[ed] little or nothing about an agency‘s own conduct.‖263  It 
then stated that once a substantial privacy interest existed, the 
party requesting information was required to identify ―a sufficient 
reason for disclosure‖ of the information.264  That reason, to use 
birth dates to learn whether governmental agencies employed sex 
 
255 Dep‘t Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 380–81 (1976). 
256 Tex. Comptroller, 354 S.W.3d at 341–42. 
257 Id. at 343, 347–58. 
258 Id. at 343 (citing 2006 Tex. Op. Att‘y Gen. 01938, at 3). 
259 See Tex. Comptroller, 354 S.W.3d at 343–44, 347 (quoting Goyer v. N.Y. State Dep’t of 
Env’tl. Conservation, 813 N.Y.S.2d 628, 639 (Sup. Ct. 2005)). 
260 Tex. Comptroller, 354 S.W.3d at 345. 
261 Id. (citing Bob Moos, How Secure is Your Social Security Data?: Researchers’ Claim 
About System’s Vulnerability Underscores Worries That Identify Theft Threat Will Rise, DALL. 
MORNING NEWS, Aug. 9, 2009, at 1D, available at 2009 WLNR 15470333). 
262 Tex. Comptroller, 354 S.W.3d at 345. 
263 Id. at 346 (quoting U.S. Dep‘t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 
489 U.S. 749, 750 (1989)). 
264 Tex. Comptroller, 354 S.W.3d at 346–47 (citing Nat‘l Archives & Records Admin. v. 
Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 172 (2004)). 
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offenders or convicted persons, was insufficient to overcome the 
substantial privacy interests of all state employees.265  It was 
insufficient because ―mere allegations of the possibility of 
wrongdoing are not enough.‖266  This standard, of course, could be 
flipped (and was by the dissent).267  The privacy interest of state 
employees was largely based on the possibility of identity theft, a 
possibility the court failed to quantify, other than to note that an 
estimate by the Federal Trade Commission of 27.3 million cases of 
identity theft.268 
The dissent by Justice Wainwright in Texas Comptroller focused 
on a structural disagreement with the court.269  Justice 
Wainwright‘s conclusion was that the legislature had made its 
intentions on date of birth information clear, making the court‘s 
statutory interpretation invalid.270  First, the legislature had chosen 
not to exempt birth dates from public disclosure.271  Second, the 
reason for the request for birth dates was based on a legitimate use 
(to search for criminal convictions, and in part to distinguish among 
the subsets of the 2,000 state employees who shared the same 
name).272  Third, the Texas legislature had: (a) passed the Identity 
Theft Enforcement and Protection Act to protect all Texans from 
identity theft; (b) chosen not to exempt birth dates from disclosure 
in the Public Information Act; and (c) continued to sell birth date 
information of Texas state employees (and others) to businesses 
without generating any problems with identity theft.273 
The dissent also argued the court erred in ignoring its precedents 
on waiver to decide the case based on section 552.102, when the 
Comptroller disclaimed that basis for adjudication.274  It then 
assessed the balancing test undertaken by the court.275  Any privacy 
interest of state employees was limited to the information, not the 
derivative use of that information (combining date of birth 
 
265 See Tex. Comptroller, 354 S.W.3d at 346–48. 
266 Id. at 346. 
267 Id. at 357–58 (Wainwright, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
268 Id. at 343 (majority opinion) (citing 2006 Tex. Op. Att‘y Gen. 01938, at 3). 
269 See Tex. Comptroller, 354 S.W.3d at 351–53 (Wainwright, J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part) (explaining that the majority decided the case based on TEX. GOV‘T CODE  § 
552.102, which advocated the balancing test, while the Comptroller limited her argument 
exclusively to § 552.101). 
270 Id. at 349–50 (Wainwright, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
271 Id. at 349. 
272 Id. at 357. 
273 Id. at 349–50. 
274 Id. 351–53 (arguing that waiver rules exist to prevent ―unfair surprise‖ of issues to the 
other party and to limit the courts‘ jurisdiction to ―existing cases or controversies‖). 
275 Id. at 353.  
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information with other personal information to engage in identity 
theft).276  Even if one were to look at the derivative use of that 
information, empirical evidence was lacking to support the court‘s 
claim that disclosure of date of birth information would lead to 
identity theft.277  The reason the request of the Dallas Morning 
News for date of birth information was legally sufficient was 
because it allowed assessment of any criminal records of 
employees.278  More telling, structurally, was Justice Wainwright‘s 
argument that, because the balancing standard had been 
acknowledged as the proper legal standard for the first time by the 
supreme court, ―[w]e cannot expect a party to present evidence for a 
standard unknown, unargued, and unapplied below.‖279 
Seven months later, the court issued its opinion in Texas 
Department of Public Safety v. Cox Texas Newspapers, L.P.280  
Pursuant to the Public Information Act, several Texas newspapers 
requested detailed information concerning travel vouchers related 
to Governor Rick Perry‘s security detail when he traveled outside 
the state.281  The Department of Public Safety (―DPS‖) refused to 
provide detailed information and requested an opinion from the 
Attorney General.282 The Attorney General concluded that 
disclosure of the requested information ―would place the governor in 
imminent threat of physical danger.‖283 Consequently, the 
information could be withheld pursuant to section 552.101.284 
Because the travel expense information was characterized as 
―core‖ public information, that information was protected from 
disclosure only if it was ―confidential under other law,‖ that is, law 
other than the Public Information Act.285  The court held that ―other 
law‖ included a common law right to be free from physical harm, 
citing an 1843 Republic of Texas case and a Texas case citing the 
preeminent American tort law scholar William Prosser, and quoting 
the venerable English legal authority William Blackstone.286  The 
 
276 Id. at 353–54.  
277 Id. at 354–55. 
278 Id. at 357. 
279 Id. at 358. 
280 Tex. Dept. of Pub. Safety v. Cox Tex. Newspapers, 343 S.W.3d 112, 112 (Tex. 2011) 
(decided July 1, 2011); Tex. Comptroller, 354 S.W.3d at 336 (decided Dec. 3, 2010). 
281 Tex. Dept. of Pub. Safety, 343 S.W.3d at 113.  
282 Id. 
283 Id. 
284 Id. 
285 Id. at 114 (emphasis omitted) (quoting In re City of Georgetown, 53 S.W.3d 328, 331 
(Tex. 2001)). 
286 Tex. Dept. of Pub. Safety, 343 S.W.3d at 115 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 125 (1769)) (citing Fisher v. Carrousel Motor 
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court noted that the common law right to be free from physical 
harm was ―more . . . entrenched in our common law than the right 
[to] privacy.‖287  Because the common law right to privacy was 
―other law‖ that protected documents from disclosure, the greater 
entrenchment of the right to be free from physical harm created a 
kind of transitive property effect.  Thus, documents that infringed 
that right to be free from physical harm should also be protected 
from disclosure.288 
The common law right to be free from physical harm led the court 
to adopt the standard allowing nondisclosure in cases in which 
there existed a ―substantial threat of physical harm.‖289  Because 
this was a newly created standard, the court remanded the case to 
the trial court for it to ―closely examine each of the disputed 
documents.‖290  It did nod in the direction of the DPS by stating 
that, in assessing security measures by looking at the vouchers 
reflecting expenses for prior trips, ―we cannot agree that 
information from prior trips could not be used to inflict future 
harm.‖291  This double negative requires some untangling.  Of 
course some person could use information from prior trips possibly 
―to inflict future harm.‖292  In other words, it is theoretically 
possible (or, to use more negative language, not impossible) that 
disclosure of this information could lead to physical harm.  But the 
earlier-adopted standard was a ―substantial‖ threat of physical 
harm,293 a quantum certainly greater than a theoretical possibility. 
Justice Wainwright concurred in the judgment, agreeing that the 
case should be remanded to the trial court.294  He disagreed with the 
court‘s analysis.  As also happened in Texas Comptroller, Justice 
Wainwright focused in part on the structural difficulties of the 
court‘s opinion: ―The [c]ourt should not judicially create an 
exception to disclosure that contradicts the Legislature‘s expressed 
intent in the [Public Information Act].‖295  His second disagreement 
 
Hotel, Inc., 424 S.W.2d 627, 629 (Tex. 1967); Benton v. Williams, Dallam 496, 496–97 (Tex. 
1843). 
287 Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 343 S.W.3d at 116. 
288 See id. at 115–16. 
289 Id. at 118.  The court adopted identical statutory language from a 2009 amendment to 
the Public Information Act that was formally inapplicable to core public information.  Id. at 
114–15 (citing Act of June 3, 2009, ch. 283, 2009 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 742 (codified as 
amended at TEX. GOV‘T CODE ANN. § 552.151 (West 2012))). 
290 Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 343 S.W.3d at 118. 
291 Id. at 119.  
292 Id. 
293 Id. at 118. 
294 Id. at 121 (Wainwright, J., concurrence). 
295 Id.; see Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts v. Atty. Gen. of Tex., 354 S.W.3d 336, 351–53 
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was one of statutory interpretation.  A 1999 legislative amendment 
to the Public Information Act required disclosure of core public 
information ―unless [it is] expressly confidential under other law.‖296  
C. Concurring Opinions 
Chief Justice Jefferson‘s concurring opinions offer significant 
evidence of his jurisprudence.  He has written approximately twelve 
concurrences since he became Chief Justice,297 at least two in the 
first two years as Chief Justice,298 four in 2008,299 and six from 2009 
through 2011.300  These opinions arise in relatively disparate areas 
of law, but all suggest his pragmatic approach to interpreting law. 
For example, one of his first concurrences concerned 
interpretations of contract law.301  In 1464-Eight, Ltd. v. Joppich, 
the majority adopted section 87(1)(a) of the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts.302  Section 87(1)(a) declared the false recital of nominal 
 
(Tex. 2010) (Wainwright, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
296 Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 343 S.W.3d at 123 (Wainwright, J., concurring) (quoting TEX 
GOV‘T CODE ANN. § 552.022 (West 1995) (amended 2011)).  
297 Search Terms in LexisNexis: Texas Federal & State Cases, Combined: JUDGE! 
(Jefferson) and CONCUR! (Jefferson); Search Terms in LexisNexis: Texas Federal & State 
Cases, Combined: JUDGE! (Jefferson) and DISSENT! (Jefferson).  The search results were 
only within the specified time period defined above, September 14, 2004 to December 31, 
2011.  See, e.g., Ojo v. Farmers Grp., Inc., 356 S.W.3d 421, 435 (Tex. 2011) (Jefferson, C.J., 
concurring); R.R. Comm‘n v. Citizens for a Safe Future & Clean Water, 336 S.W.3d 619, 633 
(Tex. 2011) (Jefferson, C.J., concurring); Marks v. St. Luke‘s Episcopal Hosp., 319 S.W.3d 658, 
666 (Tex. 2010) (Jefferson, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); Trammell Crow Cent. 
Tex., Ltd. v. Gutierrez, 267 S.W.3d 9, 17 (Tex. 2008) (Jefferson, C.J., concurring); Diversicare 
Gen. Partner, Inc. v. Rubio, 185 S.W.3d 842, 855 (Tex. 2005) (Jefferson, C.J., concurring in 
part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment), 1464–Eight, Ltd. v. Joppich, 154 
S.W.3d 101, 110 (Tex. 2004) (Jefferson, C.J., concurring). 
298 Search Terms in LexisNexis: Texas Federal & State Cases, Combined: JUDGE! 
(Jefferson) and CONCUR! (Jefferson); Search Terms in LexisNexis: Texas Federal & State 
Cases, Combined: JUDGE! (Jefferson) and DISSENT! (Jefferson).  The search results were 
only within the specified time period defined above, September 14, 2004 to September 14, 
2006.  See, e.g., Diversicare, 185 S.W.3d at 842 (majority opinion) (deciding the case Oct. 14, 
2005); Joppich, 154 S.W.3d at 101 (majority opinion) (deciding the case Dec. 31, 2004).  
299 Search Terms in LexisNexis: Texas Federal & State Cases, Combined: JUDGE! 
(Jefferson) and CONCUR! (Jefferson); Search Terms in LexisNexis: Texas Federal & State 
Cases, Combined: JUDGE! (Jefferson) and DISSENT! (Jefferson).  The search results were 
only within the specified time period defined above, January 1, 2008 to December 31, 2008.  
See, e.g., Trammel, 267 S.W.3d at 9 (majority opinion) (deciding the case in 2008). 
300 Search Terms in LexisNexis: Texas Federal & State Cases, Combined: JUDGE! 
(Jefferson) and CONCUR! (Jefferson); Search Terms in LexisNexis: Texas Federal & State 
Cases, Combined: JUDGE! (Jefferson) and DISSENT! (Jefferson).  The search results were 
only within the specified time period defined above, January 1, 2009 to December 31, 2011.  
See, e.g., Ojo, 356 S.W.3d at 421 (majority opinion) (decided May 27, 2011); R.R. Comm’n, 336 
S.W.3d at 619 (majority opinion) (decided May 27, 2011); Marks, 319 S.W.3d at 658 (majority 
opinion) (decided Aug. 27, 2010). 
301 See Joppich, 154 S.W.3d at 102. 
302 Id. at 110; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87(1)(a) (1979). 
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consideration was sufficient to make an offer irrevocable in an 
option contract.303  Chief Justice Jefferson‘s concurrence urged the 
court to take another step toward the reform of contract law and 
hold that promises for an option in a commercial matter should be 
enforceable without proof of any consideration.304  Quoting the 
authors of a leading treatise, the Chief Justice advocated the end of 
consideration in such matters because such a rule avoided ―fictional 
charades [that] should not be a part of a mature legal system.‖305  
The concurrence noted his proposed view was ―hardly novel,‖ having 
been adopted by the English judge, Lord Mansfield in commercial 
matters in late eighteenth century England, and proposed by the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 
1925.306  The ―dogged insistence‖ on requiring a recital of 
consideration was a harmful formalism that served no purpose in 
commercial options contracts.307 
In Trammel Crow Central Texas, Ltd. v. Gutierrez, the issue was 
the duty of landowners to protect invitees from criminal acts by 
third parties.308  The majority held that the no-duty rule applied to 
the facts and reversed the court of appeals.309  Luis Gutierrez and 
his wife, Karol Ferman, were walking toward their car at the 
Quarry Market in San Antonio after leaving a movie theater.310  
Luis was shot four times and died.311  His widow and mother sued 
on their own behalf as well as in behalf of his five children, claiming 
the owner negligently failed to provide adequate security.312  A jury 
returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and awarded $5 million in 
damages.313  Plaintiffs offered testimony that the shooting was a 
consequence of a robbery, and to prove their theory, offered evidence 
that the police collected several items at the scene but not Luis‘s 
wallet.314  The defense claimed Luis was deliberately targeted and 
killed for providing police information about several burglaries in 
 
303 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87(1)(a) (1979). 
304 See Joppich, 154 S.W.3d at 111 (Jefferson, C.J., concurring). 
305 Id. (quoting 2 JOSEPH M. PERILLO & HELEN HADJIYANNAKIS BENDER, CORBIN ON 
CONTRACTS § 5.17 (rev. ed. 1995)). 
306 Joppich, 154 S.W.3d at 112 (citing Kevin M. Teeven, Development of Reform of the 
Preexisting Duty Rule and Its Persistent Survival, 47 ALA. L. REV. 387, 401 n.314, 439 (1996)). 
307 See Joppich, 154 S.W.3d at 112–14. 
308 Trammell Crow Cent. Tex., Ltd. v. Gutierrez, 267 S.W.3d 9, 10–11 (Tex. 2008). 
309 Id. at 11. 
310 Id. 
311 Id. 
312 Id. 
313 Id. at 12. 
314 Id. at 11–12. 
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which he had been involved.315  Using a five-factor test, the court 
held that Luis‘s murder was not foreseeable, and thus the defendant 
lacked any duty to Luis to protect him from harm by third 
parties.316 
In his concurrence for four members of the court, Chief Justice 
Jefferson concluded the crime was foreseeable.317  The plaintiffs 
offered evidence of ten instances of violent crime at the Quarry 
Market, all of which were robberies, in ―the two years preceding 
Gutierrez‘s death.‖318  Though the crime was foreseeable, that did 
not give rise to a duty by the defendant to protect Gutierrez.319  A 
duty to protect persons from the criminal actions of third parties 
arose only if the risk of criminal conduct was unreasonable.320  The 
inquiry into the number of prior similar incidents to determine 
whether it was unreasonable that an invitee could suffer harm at 
the hands of a third party was misplaced.321  Chief Justice Jefferson 
instead urged the adoption of a balancing test that weighed the 
possibility of the risk and likelihood of harm against the attendant 
burdens on landowners.322  In his weighing, the number of violent 
incidents was ―relatively few‖ and the burden upon landowners to 
prevent a ―brazen attack‖ was ―tremendous.‖323  Thus, the defendant 
did not owe plaintiff a duty in law.324 
Marks v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hospital, released in August 2010, 
was another tort law case, once again requiring the court to 
interpret the now-superseded Medical Liability and Insurance 
Improvement Act (―MLIIA‖).325  Irving Marks was injured while 
attempting to get out of a hospital bed.326  He sued, claiming the 
footboard of the bed was negligently assembled and maintained, 
causing him to fall.327  The trial court held that Marks‘s claim was a 
 
315 Id. at 12. 
316 See id. at 12, 15, 17 (explaining that in order for the owner of the premises to have a 
duty of care to protect people from criminal acts of third parties, the risk of harm must be 
foreseeable, and in this case it was not, therefore no such duty existed). 
317 Id. at 18 (Jefferson, C.J., concurring). 
318 Id. 
319 Id. at 18–19. 
320 See id. at 18. 
321 See id. at 18–19. 
322 Id. at 18. 
323 Id. at 19. 
324 Id. 
325 Marks v. St. Luke‘s Episcopal Hosp., 319 S.W.3d 658, 658, 660 (Tex. 2010); see Medical 
Liability and Insurance Improvement Act of Texas, ch. 817, 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws 2039 
(repealed 2003) (codified as amended TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN., art. 4590i, § 1.01 (West 
2012)).  
326 Marks, 319 S.W.3d at 660. 
327 Id. 
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health care liability claim as defined by the MLIIA.328  Because 
Marks failed to meet the requirements of the MLIIA (he failed to 
file an expert report in a timely manner), his claims were 
dismissed.329  The court of appeals reversed, holding Marks‘s claim 
was not an MLIIA healthcare liability claim.330  In a per curiam 
opinion, the Texas Supreme Court remanded the matter to the court 
of appeals to evaluate the case in the light of the supreme court‘s 
opinion in Diversicare General Partner, Inc. v. Rubio.331  In 
Diversicare, the issue was whether a resident of a nursing home, 
who was sexually assaulted by another resident of the home, could 
make claims of negligent supervision and failure to provide 
reasonably safe premises outside of the MLIIA.332  The supreme 
court held the claim was covered by the MLIIA, and the case was 
dismissed because the claim was made after the two-year statute of 
limitations window.333  It did, however, conclude that premises-
liability claims that are ―separable‖ from medical care liability 
claims were not subject to the MLIIA.334 
On remand, a divided court of appeals affirmed the trial court.335  
The case then returned to the supreme court, and in 2009 it held 
Marks‘s claim was not a healthcare liability claim, but a premises-
liability claim.336  That opinion was withdrawn,337 and the court 
 
328 Id.  The MLIIA defined a ―[h]ealth care liability claim‖ as: 
[A] cause of action against a health care provider or physician for treatment, lack of 
treatment, or other claimed departure from accepted standards of medical care or health 
care or safety which proximately results in injury to or death of the patient, whether the 
patient‘s claim or cause of action sounds in tort or contract. 
Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act of Texas, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN., art. 
4590i, § 1.03(a)(4) (West 2012) (repealed 2003). 
329 Marks, 319 S.W.3d at 661. 
330 Id. at 660. 
331 Marks v. St. Luke‘s Episcopal Hosp., 193 S.W.3d 575, 575 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam) 
(citing Diversicare Gen. Partner, Inc. v. Rubio, 185 S.W.3d 842 (Tex. 2005)), remanded to 229 
S.W.3d 396 (Tex. App. 2007), aff’d, 319 S.W.3d 658 (Tex. 2010)). 
332 Diversicare, 185 S.W.3d at 844–45. 
333 Id. at 855. 
334 See id. at 845, 851, 854 (noting that plaintiff‘s premise-liability claims were actually 
healthcare liability claims, and that the court would not allow someone to portray their 
healthcare liability claim as a premise-liability claim to avoid the statute of limitation 
requirements of the MLIIA). 
335 See Marks, 229 S.W.3d at 398. 
336 Marks, 319 S.W.3d app. at 676–77 (Jefferson, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in 
part); Marks v. St. Luke‘s Episcopal Hosp., No. 07-0783, 2009 WL 2667801, at *1 (Tex. Aug. 
28, 2009), withdrawn, 319 S.W.3d 659.  The withdrawn opinion is attached to Chief Justice 
Jefferson‘s opinion in Marks. 319 S.W.3d at 676 (Jefferson, C.J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part). 
337 Marks, 2009 WL 2667801, at *1, withdrawn, 319 S.W.3d 659 (withdrawing opinion on 
grant of rehearing Aug. 27, 2010). 
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mulled the case for another year.338  A plurality of the court held, 
―[b]ecause the provision of a safe hospital bed was an inseparable 
part of the health care services provided during Marks‘s 
convalescence from back surgery, we conclude that his cause of 
action for injuries allegedly caused by the unsafe bed is a health 
care liability claim.‖339 
Chief Justice Jefferson‘s opinion concurring in part and 
dissenting in part in Marks was brief and to the point: Marks 
inserted ―discord‖ rather than ―consistency‖ into Texas law.340  It did 
so because it both kept the initial conclusion in Marks that the 
MLIIA was implicated ―only if the underlying claim directly relates 
to a patient‘s care and treatment‖ and abandoned the initial 
conclusion that the hospital bed was separable from treatment.341 
The plurality, the Chief Justice noted, was required by the 
Diversicare standard to ―explain how a piece of wood at the end of a 
bed is integral to medical care.‖342  The plurality had difficulty 
meeting that duty because the 2009 withdrawn opinion had 
―describe[d] in great detail why the footboard was not integral to St. 
Luke‘s delivery of health care services to Marks.‖343  He then made 
a classic slippery-slope argument, noting that Marks could have 
fallen and injured himself from sitting on a defective chair in his 
room, or a bedside table.344  ―What if Marks fell down a ‗rickety 
staircase‘ while perambulating for the first time after surgery?‖345 
The ability to distinguish harms suffered because of a fall from a 
rickety staircase from harms suffered when falling as a result of a 
faulty footboard created both a formalism (what was integral to 
medical care and what was incidental to a patient‘s care) that 
lacked the clarity of categorical standards and a contextual 
standard that used ―overlapping‖ factors, making any assessment 
more difficult.346  Because the court had applied the Diversicare 
 
338 Marks, 319 S.W.3d at 658–60 (majority opinion) (withdrawing the Aug. 28, 2009 
opinion and re-deciding the issues on Aug. 27, 2010). 
339 Id. at 666. 
340 Id. at 675 (Jefferson, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
341 Id. at 674. 
342 Id. at 675. 
343 Id. 
344 Id. (―The footboard could as easily have been a chair in his room or a bedside table.‖). 
345 Id. (quoting Diversicare Gen. Partner, Inc. v. Rubio, 185 S.W.3d 842, 854 (Tex. 2005)).  
The reference to the rickety staircase was an example given by the majority in Diversicare in 
response to Chief Justice Jefferson‘s opinion.  See Diversicare, 185 S.W.3d at 854.  The 
Diversicare court used this example to suggest why it adopted a rule allowing premises 
liability claims for injuries separable from health care liability claims.  See id. 
346 See Marks, 319 S.W.3d at 675–76 (Jefferson, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in 
part) (quoting Marks, 319 S.W.3d app. at 680 (Jefferson, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting 
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standard, he would as well, concluding that, based on that 
standard, the footboard was not ―integral to or inseparable from the 
health care services‖ the defendant provided to Marks.347 
The Chief Justice‘s opinion in Marks echoed his opinion in 
Diversicare.  As was true in Marks, he concurred in part and 
dissented in part.348  His separate opinion in Diversicare proposed 
another path.  A health care liability claim was defined as ―a cause 
of action against a health care provider or physician for treatment, 
lack of treatment, or other claimed departure from accepted 
standards of medical care or health care or safety.‖349 
The legislature failed to define ―safety,‖ but provided that any 
legal term should be interpreted consistently with the common 
law.350  The common law meaning of safety meant, ―not exposed to 
danger [and] not causing danger.‖351  To be free from danger was, in 
his opinion, ―without limitation.‖352  That meant free from the 
danger of a sexual assault by another resident of the nursing home, 
making Rubio‘s claim in Diversicare a healthcare liability claim 
under the MLIIA.353  ―While it may be logical to read into the 
statute a requirement that a safety related claim also involve[s] 
health care,‖ neither the implicit meaning of safety in the common 
law, nor the explicit text of the MLIIA allowed such a reading.354  
Because courts ―take statutes as they find them‖355 any complaints 
about the expansive reach of the MLIIA were to be directed to the 
legislature. 
 
in part); Marks v. St. Luke‘s Episcopal Hosp., No. 07-0783, 2009 WL 2667801 (Tex. Aug. 28, 
2009), withdrawn, 319 S.W.3d 659). 
347 Marks, 319 S.W.3d at 674; Diversicare, 185 S.W.3d at 855.  Two student comments 
discuss the problems arising from these two decisions.  See Jonathan D. Nowlin, Comment, 
Scalpel, Please: Why the Definitions of “Health Care Liability Claim” in Chapter 74 of the 
Civil Practices and Remedies Code is Not as Clean-Cut as It Could Be, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 
1247, 1269–70 (2011) (discussing how the Texas Supreme Court‘s interpretation of Article 
4590i in Marks and Diversicare offered guidance for the interpretation of Chapter 74); David 
R. Schlottman, Note, In Critical Condition: Diversicare General Partner, Inc. v. Rubio, Marks 
v. St. Luke‘s Episcopal Hospital, and the State of Health-Care-Liability Claims in Texas, 63 
BAYLOR L. REV. 526, 527–28 (2011) (discussing the problems arising from Diversicare and 
Marks, including the inherent difficulties in distinguishing health-care liability claims from 
premises-liability claims). 
348 Diversicare, 185 S.W.3d at 855 (Jefferson, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
349 Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act of Texas, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN., 
art. 4590i, § 1.03(a)(4) (West 2012) (repealed 2003). 
350 See Diversicare, 185 S.W.3d at 860–61. 
351 See id. (quoting BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 1362 (8th ed. 2004)). 
352 Diversicare, 185 S.W.3d at 861. 
353 See id. 
354 Id. 
355 Id. (quoting Simmons v. Arnim, 220 S.W. 66, 70 (Tex. 1920)). 
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The Diversicare court rejected this option,356 which is why Chief 
Justice Jefferson had joined the majority in the 2009 withdrawn 
opinion in Marks.357  Now, it appeared, the court had changed its 
mind to declare the footboard was ―integral‖ or ―inseparable‖ from 
healthcare services.358 This, he prophesied, would lead to 
inconsistent results.359  And at least two Texas court of appeals 
opinions issued since Marks have appeared to limit its applicability, 
generating additional uncertainty.360 
The withdrawn 2009 opinion in Marks was decided by a 5–4 
court.361  It was written by Justice Medina, and joined by Justices 
Harriet O‘Neill, Scott Brister, Paul Green, and Chief Justice 
Jefferson.362  The 2010 Marks decision was also written by Justice 
Medina.363  His opinion was joined only by Justice Hecht.364  Parts I 
and IV of Medina‘s opinion were joined by Justices Wainwright, 
Johnson, and Willett, each of whom had dissented in the 2009 
opinion.365  Between August 2009 and August 2010, Justices Brister 
and O‘Neill had left the court, replaced by Justices Eva Guzman 
and Deborah Lehrmann, respectively.366  The two new justices 
effectively took the same position as their predecessors.  Thus, the 
 
356 See Diversicare, 185 S.W.3d at 854–55. 
357 See Marks v. St. Luke‘s Episcopal Hosp., 319 S.W.3d 658 app. at 676–77 (Tex. 2010) 
(Jefferson, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (noting in the withdrawn opinion that 
the majority held the claim was a premises-liability claim instead of a healthcare liability 
claim); Marks v. St. Luke‘s Episcopal Hosp., No. 07-0783, 2009 WL 2667801, at *1 (Tex. Aug. 
28, 2009), withdrawn, 319 S.W.3d 659. 
358 Marks, 319 S.W.3d at 664 (majority opinion). 
359 See id. at 675 (Jefferson, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
360 See Nexus Recovery Ctr., Inc. v. Mathis, 336 S.W.3d 360, 370 (Tex. App. 2011) (holding 
that claims against a treatment center for failure to inquire of its counselor‘s history of 
sexually exploiting patients and failing to halt or prevent such exploitation of a former 
patient were not healthcare liability claims); Cardwell v. McDonald, 356 S.W.3d 646, 649–50 
(Tex. App. 2011) (holding that a claim that a psychiatrist deceptively engaged in ―marriage 
counseling‖ sessions with plaintiff to gain evidence harmful to her in divorce litigation with 
her husband was not a healthcare liability claim). 
361 Marks, 319 S.W.3d app. at 676 (Jefferson, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) 
(demonstrating a 5–3 decision, with Justices Medina, O‘Neill, Brister, Green, and Chief 
Justice Jefferson in the majority, and Justices Johnson, Hecht, Wainwright, and Willett 
making up the minority in the withdrawn 2009 opinion); Marks, 2009 WL 2667801, at *1, 
withdrawn, 319 S.W.3d 659. 
362 Marks, 319 S.W.3d app. at 676 (Jefferson, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) 
(showing that Justices Medina, O‘Neill, Brister, Green, and Chief Justice Jefferson were in 
the majority, while Justices Johnson, Hecht, Wainwright, and Willett made up the minority 
in the withdrawn 2009 opinion); Marks, 2009 WL 2667801, at *1, withdrawn, 319 S.W.3d 659. 
363 Marks, 319 S.W.3d at 659. 
364 Id. 
365 Id.; Marks, 319 S.W.3d app. at 676; Marks, 2009 WL 2667801, at *1, withdrawn, 319 
S.W.3d 658. 
366 See Marks, 319 S.W.3d at 663; Marks, 319 S.W.3d 658 app. at 676; Marks, 2009 WL 
2667801, at *1, withdrawn, 319 S.W.3d 658. 
24_ARIENS 7/30/2012  7:24 PM 
2011/2012] A Judge in Full: Wallace Jefferson 2187 
only person whose vote changed was Justice David Medina.367  The 
decision by Chief Justice Jefferson to include the 2009 opinion as an 
appendix to his separate opinion subtly informs the reader whose 
(Justice Medina) opinion has shifted.368  Chief Justice Jefferson‘s 
opinion remains resolutely professional, and offers a sense of the 
Chief Justice‘s attention to the tensions and necessities of small-
group decision-making. 
As seen in the Diversicare/Marks cases, the Texas Supreme Court 
is regularly engaged in constructing and interpreting statutes.  Its 
members generally lean toward ―originalist‖ approaches to 
statutory interpretation, using dictionaries to fix the meaning of 
words left undefined by statute, largely relying on plain meaning 
interpretation and downplaying purposive statutory construction.369  
Chief Justice Jefferson generally follows this approach, as he did in 
Diversicare and Marks.370  However, his approach to statutory 
interpretation, on occasion, is both narrower and broader than that 
taken by his colleagues.  Two concurrences offer a sense of his 
overarching understanding of statutory interpretation. 
In Railroad Commission of Texas v. Texas Citizens for a Safe 
Future & Clean Water, the statutory phrase that required 
interpretation was ―public interest.‖371  The Railroad Commission of 
Texas was required by the Texas Water Code ―to weigh the ‗public 
interest‘‖ in determining whether to issue a permit for an oil and 
gas injection well.372 The court held the Commission‘s interpretation 
of ―public interest‖ ―was reasonable and in accord with the plain 
language of the statute,‖ and thus should be given deference by the 
judiciary.373  Specifically, the question was whether the Commission 
unreasonably interpreted ―public interest‖ by failing to consider 
 
367 See Marks, 319 S.W.3d at 659, 666 (showing Medina affirmed the court of appeals 
opinion); Marks, 319 S.W.3d app. at 676–77 (showing that Justice Medina‘s opinion in 2009 
reversed the court of appeals opinion); Marks, 2009 WL 2667801, at *1, withdrawn, 319 
S.W.3d 658. 
368 See Marks, 319 S.W.3d at 676 et seq. (Jefferson, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in 
part). 
369 A study of the interpretive approaches taken by the two highest Texas courts is found 
in Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological 
Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1780, 1787–91 (2010). 
370 See Marks, 319 S.W.3d at 675 (Jefferson, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) 
(assigning the word ―safety‖ a common meaning to help interpret its use in the statute); 
Diversicare Gen. Partner, Inc. v. Rubio, 185 S.W.3d 842, 863–64 (Tex. 2005) (Jefferson, C.J., 
concurring) (interpreting the term ―health care liability claim‖).  
371 R.R. Comm‘n of Tex. v. Tex. Citizens for a Safe Future & Clean Water, 336 S.W.3d 619, 
621 (Tex. 2011). 
372 Id. 
373 Id. at 621. 
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public safety concerns, including traffic safety, in deciding whether 
to issue the permit.374  Texas Citizens for a Safe Future and Clean 
Water opposed issuance of the permit because, it argued, trucks 
carrying away waste-water would damage roads used by area 
residents.375  The Commission issued the permit.376  It concluded, 
adopting the conclusion of its hearing examiners, that the public 
interest was met because issuing the permit would increase the 
amount of oil and gas recovered in the area and serve as an 
economical way to dispose of salt water.377  The court of appeals 
held that the Commission abused its discretion by interpreting 
―public interest‖ by considering just ―the conservation of natural 
resources.‖378 
The Texas Supreme Court concluded that if ―a statutory term is 
subject to multiple understandings [the court] should defer to an 
agency‘s reasonable interpretation.‖379  Not only was ―public 
interest‖ left undefined by the legislature, the phrase was ―anything 
but clear and unambiguous.‖380  Because the Commission 
reasonably interpreted public interest by limiting itself to consider 
―only . . . matters within its expertise,‖ its unwillingness to consider 
traffic safety was reasonable under the statutory scheme set forth 
in the Water Code.381 
It was the majority‘s conclusion that ―public interest‖ was subject 
to ―multiple understandings‖ that led Chief Justice Jefferson to 
write separately.382  Although ―public interest‖ was ―ambiguous as 
to some conceivable set of facts,‖383 it was not ambiguous in every 
reading, and certainly not in this case.384  The Water Code‘s text 
and context prohibited the Commission to consider traffic safety.385  
Thus, no deference was to be given to the Commission‘s 
interpretation of the statute.386 
 
374 Id. at 623–24. 
375 Id. at 622. 
376 See id. at 623–24. 
377 Id. at 622–23. 
378 Id. at 623 (citing Tex. Citizens for a Safe Future & Clean Water v. R.R. Comm‘n of Tex., 
254 S.W.3d 492, 503 (Tex. App. 2007)). 
379 R.R. Comm‘n of Tex. v. Tex. Citizens for a Safe Future & Clean Water, 336 S.W.3d 619, 
628 (Tex. 2011) (citing Fiess v. State Farm Lloyds, 202 S.W.3d 744, 747–48 (Tex. 2006)). 
380 R.R. Comm’n of Tex., 336 S.W.3d at 628. 
381 Id. at 630 (emphasis omitted). 
382 Id. at 628 (majority opinion); id. at 633 (Jefferson, C.J., concurring). 
383 Id. at 633 (Jefferson, C.J., concurring).  
384 See id. at 634. 
385 See id. (―[P]ublic interest, in the context of the statute . . . is limited to the consideration 
of factors consistent with the chapter‘s purpose . . . .‖). 
386 Id. 
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Chief Justice Jefferson‘s mention of text and context illuminates 
his concurring opinion two months later in Ojo v. Farmers Group, 
Inc.387  The certified question from the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was whether the Texas Insurance 
Code prohibited an insurance company from pricing insurance 
based on ―a credit-score factor that has a racially disparate 
impact.‖388   The court held that race-based credit scoring violated 
the Code, but race-neutral credit scoring that generated a racially 
disparate impact did not violate the Code.389 
The Chief Justice‘s concurring opinion begins: ―Legislative history 
is not always a villain.‖390  This introduction allows Chief Justice 
Jefferson to explain both why the courts are ―text-centric,‖ and why 
courts occasionally adopt extrinsic aids to statutory construction.391  
This introduction leads to several eloquent statements about the 
goals and purposes of a written legal opinion.392  He initially writes 
that an appellate opinion is ―one part of a dialogue between parties, 
citizens, legislators, and judges—a dialogue that provides a 
historical record of the relevant controversy.‖393 
This dialogue, he continues, is presented to make the court‘s 
opinion ―more approachable to our readers and more easily 
integrated into our social fabric.‖394  And that is because judges are 
both ―storytellers and historians.‖395  In one of his most trenchant 
declarations, he writes, ―[w]e tell these stories because doing so is 
crucial to our legitimacy.‖396  Because judgments of the court are 
enforced through the ―threat of state authority,‖397 a narrative by 
courts best legitimizes its actions.  Citations to extrinsic aids tell 
the reader ―why,‖ even when ―why‖ is irrelevant to the court‘s 
conclusion.  The irrelevance of the legislature‘s intent to the court‘s 
interpretation of the Insurance Code has relevance in another way: 
―The inclusion of this history gives notice to those who feel wronged 
 
387 See Ojo v. Farmers Grp., Inc., 356 S.W.3d 421, 35 (Tex. 2011) (Jefferson, C.J., 
concurring). 
388 Id. at 422 (majority opinion); see Ojo v. Farmers Grp., Inc., 600 F.3d 1201, 1202–03 (9th 
Cir. 2010). 
389 Ojo, 356 S.W.3d at 422. 
390 Id. at 435 (Jefferson, C.J., concurring). 
391 Id. at 435–36. 
392 Id. at 436–37. 
393 Id. at 436. 
394 Id. at 437. 
395 Id. 
396 Id. at 437. 
397 Id.  For a discussion on the violence inherent in the ―threat of state authority‖ see 
Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1609–10, 1613 (1986). 
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by the statute.‖398  It offers a contextual history to buttress 
―engagement in the political process‖ by those who ―feel wronged.‖399 
D. Dissenting Opinions 
As is true of his concurring opinions, Chief Justice Jefferson has 
dissented in a greater number of cases more recently than in his 
earliest years as Chief Justice.  After dissenting six times between 
2004 through 2007,400 he has dissented thirteen times from 2008 
through 2011.401  A significant number of these dissents may be 
broadly categorized as tort matters.402  Others concern practice and 
procedure and statutory interpretation, or a combination of practice 
and procedure in an underlying tort matter. 
An early dissent demonstrates Chief Justice Jefferson‘s insistence 
on the importance of process.  In In re Allied Chemical Corporation, 
a 5–4 court403 held the issue before the court was not moot, and 
 
398 Ojo, 356 S.W.3d at 437 (Jefferson, C.J., concurring). 
399 Id. at 439. 
400 See, e.g., HEB Ministries, Inc. v. Tex. Higher Educ. Coordinating Bd., 235 S.W.3d 627, 
661 (Tex. 2007) (Jefferson, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); In re Allied Chem. 
Corp., 227 S.W.3d 652, 663 (Tex. 2007) (Jefferson, C.J., dissenting).  Search Terms in 
LexisNexis: Texas Federal & State Cases, Combined: JUDGE! (Jefferson) and DISSENT! 
(Jefferson) Federal & State Cases, Combined: JUDGE! (Jefferson) and CONCUR! (Jefferson).  
The search was limited to January 1, 2004–December 31, 2007. 
401 See, e.g., Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d 1, 13 (Tex. 2008) 
(Jefferson, C.J., dissenting); DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Inman, 252 S.W.3d 299 (Tex. 2008) 
(Jefferson, C.J., dissenting); Search Terms in LexisNexis: Texas Federal & State Cases, 
Combined: OPINIONBY (Jefferson) and DISSENT! (Jefferson); Federal & State Cases, 
Combined: OPINIONBY (Jefferson) and CONCUR! (Jefferson).  The search was limited to 
January 1, 2008–December 31, 2011. 
402 I include product liability, medical malpractice, and class action matters, as well as two 
cases that implicate First Amendment claims.  See, e.g., Pleasant Glade, 264 S.W.3d at 2, 5–6 
(involving an intentional tort and First Amendment claim); Inman, 252 S.W.3d at 300, 302 
(regarding a class action product liability matter); HEB Ministries, 235 S.W.3d at 642 
(litigating a First Amendment claim); In re Allied Chem. Corp., 227 S.W.3d at 653 (describing 
a class action tort claim).  Chief Justice Jefferson‘s dissents include MCI Sales & Serv., Inc. v. 
Hinton, 329 S.W.3d 475, 505 (Tex. 2010) (Jefferson, C.J., dissenting in part); Jelinek v. Casas, 
328 S.W.3d 526, 541 (Tex. 2010) (Jefferson, C.J., dissenting in part); Garcia v. Gomez, 319 
S.W.3d 638, 644 (Tex. 2010) (Jefferson, C.J., dissenting); Spectrum Healthcare Res., Inc. v. 
McDaniel, 306 S.W.3d 249, 254 (Tex. 2010) (Jefferson, C.J., dissenting); Hernandez v. Ebrom, 
289 S.W.3d 316, 322 (Tex. 2009) (Jefferson, C.J., dissenting); Pleasant Glade Assembly of God, 
264 S.W.3d at 13 (Jefferson, C.J., dissenting); Inman, 252 S.W.3d 299 (Jefferson, C.J., 
dissenting); HEB Ministries, Inc., 235 S.W.3d at 661 (Jefferson, C.J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part); In re Allied Chem. Corp., 227 S.W.3d at 663 (Jefferson, C.J., dissenting); 
F.F.P. Operating Partners, L.P. v. Duenez, 237 S.W.3d 680, 694 (Tex. 2007) (Jefferson, C.J., 
dissenting); Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Ramirez, 159 S.W.3d 897, 913 (Tex. 2004); Diversicare 
Gen. Partner, Inc. v. Rubio, 185 S.W.3d 842, 855 (Tex. 2005) (Jefferson, C.J., concurring in 
part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment); Marks v. St. Luke‘s Episcopal 
Hosp., 319 S.W.3d 658, 658, 674 (Tex. 2010) (Jefferson, C.J., concurring and dissenting). 
403 See Allied Chem. Corp., 227 S.W.3d at 654, 659 (showing a 5–4 majority decision, 
written by Justice Brister and joined by Justice Hecht, Justice Medina, Justice Green, and 
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created a procedural rule that, as stated by the Chief Justice, ―for 
the first time, creates an inactive docket for complex mass tort cases 
like this one.‖404  The reason for the court‘s insistence may be found 
in its characterization of the plaintiffs‘ claim.  Plaintiffs alleged 
―exposure to a ‗toxic soup‘ of emissions in the air for many decades.  
As we recently noted, no such claim ‗has ever been tried or appealed 
in Texas,‘ and thus ‗the tort is immature.‘‖405 
Chief Justice Jefferson‘s dissent concluded the matter before the 
court was moot.406  Additionally, the Chief Justice suggested the 
majority used the claim for mandamus relief to effect reform in 
mass tort cases, a reform properly undertaken through either the 
court‘s rulemaking process or through legislation.407  Asking a series 
of questions about the contours of this new rule, he concluded that 
the court‘s answers ―will be made on an ad hoc basis, with little 
guarantee of predictability or uniformity.‖408 
In another 5–4 case, DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Inman, the court 
held the plaintiffs representing a class of millions lacked standing 
to sue.409  The named plaintiffs claimed that it was too easy to 
unlatch the seatbelts on DaimlerChrysler vehicles, and demanded 
that the manufacturer replace these seatbelts with others more 
difficult to unlatch.410  Because the likelihood of injury was remote, 
the majority held the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring this class 
action lawsuit.411 
In dissent, Chief Justice Jefferson concluded the majority 
conflated the issues of standing and the substantive merits of the 
claim.412  Because Texas ―law on warranty claims based on 
unmanifested defects is unclear,‖413 and because Texas‘s law of 
standing required only a ―real controversy . . . determined by the 
judicial declaration sought‖ by plaintiffs,414 both of which existed in 
this case, the representatives of the class possessed standing to 
 
Justice Willet and a dissenting opinion written by Chief Justice Jefferson and joined by 
Justice O‘Neill, Justice Wainwright, and Justice Johnson). 
404 Id. at 664 (Jefferson, C.J., dissenting). 
405 Id. at 654 (quoting In re Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 145 S.W.3d 203, 208 (Tex. 2004)). 
406 Allied Chem. Corp., 227 S.W.3d at 664 (Jefferson, C.J., dissenting). 
407 Id. at 665–66. 
408 Id. at 666. 
409 See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Inman, 252 S.W.3d 299, 307–08 (Tex. 2008). 
410 Id. at 300. 
411 See id. at 301, 307–08. 
412 Id. at 308 (Jefferson, C.J., dissenting). 
413 Id. at 309. 
414 Id. at 308 (quoting Austin Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Lovato, 171 S.W.3d 845, 849 (Tex. 
2005)). 
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sue.415 
Both decisions emphasize the importance of process, especially as 
an antidote to the rush to declare substantive law.  In re Allied 
Chemical Corporation arose in deep south Texas,416 which many 
Republicans and self-described tort reformers believe is one of the 
Texas ―judicial hellholes‖ where defense lawyers fear to tread.417  
Like Allied Chemical, Inman was a mass tort case.418  In both cases 
the majority viewed the claims with suspicion, or even disbelief.419  
But those substantive misgivings, the Chief Justice urged his 
readers, were irrelevant to the procedural decisions that needed to 
be made.420 
Two additional dissenting opinions deserve some attention.  Both 
cases concerned claims of religious liberty.421  HEB Ministries, Inc. 
v. Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board is a prolix plurality 
opinion concerning regulation of the awarding of ―degree[s]‖ by a 
―seminary.‖422  Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert 
concerns an intentional tort claim against a religious institution 
and several of its ministers, and a holding that significantly 
expands immunity from tort liability available to religious 
institutions.423 
In HEB Ministries, the issue was the constitutionality of a Texas 
law requiring every post-secondary school to meet certain standards 
before they may issue ―degree[s],‖ including ―associate,‖ ―bachelor,‖ 
―master[‘s],‖ and ―doctor[al]‖ degrees.424  The law also required 
certain standards be met before a school may call itself a 
―seminary.‖425  The Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board is 
given the power to provide a ―certificate of authority‖ to schools that 
 
415 See DaimlerChrysler, 252 S.W.3d at 308, 316. 
416 In re Allied Chem. Corp., 227 S.W.3d 652, 654 (Tex. 2007). 
417 ARIENS, supra note 2, at 282 (quoting LAWRENCE J. MCQUILLAN & HOVANNES 
ABRAMYAN, PAC. RESEARCH INST., U.S. TORT LIABILITY INDEX: 2008 REPORT 21 (2008)). 
418 In re Allied Chem. Corp., 227 S.W.3d at 653 (describing a class action tort claim); 
Inman, 252 S.W.3d at 300, 302 (regarding a class action product liability tort matter). 
419 See In re Allied Chemical Corp., 227 S.W.3d at 654, 656–57; Inman, 252 S.W.3d at 306. 
420 See In re Allied Chemical Corp., 227 S.W.3d at 664–65 (Jefferson, C.J., dissenting); 
Inman, 252 S.W.3d at 313. 
421 Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d 1, 2 (Tex. 2008) (involving the 
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment); HEB Ministries, Inc. v. Tex. Higher Educ. 
Coordinating Bd., 235 S.W.3d 627, 630 (Tex. 2007) (discussing the state requirements 
imposed on a private post-secondary school before they may be deemed a school involved in 
religious education and training). 
422 HEB Ministries, 235 S.W.3d at 630. 
423 Pleasant Glade, 264 S.W.3d at 5, 13 (majority opinion) (Jefferson, C.J., dissenting). 
424 HEB Ministries, 235 S.W.3d at 630. 
425 Id. 
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meet these standards.426  A fractured court held the state 
unconstitutionally preferred ―one kind of religious instruction over 
another‖ in violation of the Establishment Clause, favoring those 
who were certified against those that were not.427  The plurality did 
not simply declare unconstitutional the state‘s action restricting the 
use of the word ―seminary‖ to certified institutions.428  It also 
concluded the state impermissibly endorsed certain religious 
institutions, allowing only those certified institutions to use the 
phrase ―bachelor‘s‖ diploma.429  In a part of the opinion joined by a 
majority, including Chief Justice Jefferson, the opinion also held 
restricting the use of the word ―seminary‖ to certified religious 
institutions violated the Free Exercise Clause as interpreted by the 
Supreme Court of the United States in Employment Division v. 
Smith.430  A fractured plurality also held unconstitutional, as 
violating of the Free Exercise Clause, the state‘s limitations on the 
use of the word ―degree.‖431  
As the Chief Justice notes, the plurality strains to make this an 
Establishment Clause case.432  It can only do so by concluding that 
the Coordinating Board favors some ―religious‖ entities, which 
prejudices HEB Ministries.433  This, of course, would better fit an 
Equal Protection Clause argument.  On the plurality‘s Free 
Exercise analysis and the state‘s restriction of the use of the word 
―degree,‖ his dissent notes that state law is not motivated by 
religious animus, but is merely a neutral, generally applicable law 
constitutional under Supreme Court precedent.434  Ockham‘s Razor 
works well here.  The plurality, the dissent indicates, must engage 
in a ―strained reading of the record and the case law‖435 to conclude 
the law restricts communication of religious beliefs, which allows it 
to call the case a ―hybrid‖ case that returns the court to ―compelling 
interest‖ analysis,436 which Employment Division v. Smith so 
carefully cabined.437  A simpler explanation is that the law was 
 
426 Id. at 631. 
427 See id. at 630, 645, 657 (displaying a ―fractured‖ court also). 
428 Id. at 645, 657. 
429 See id. at 630, 632 (showing that the majority of the court shared this opinion). 
430 See id. at 630, 650, 654, 657 (citing Emp‘t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878–79 (1990)). 
431 HEB Ministries, 235 S.W.3d at 630, 657–58, 661 (displaying that the court was 
fractured).  
432 Id. at 662, 665–66 (Jefferson, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
433 Id. at 665–66 (quoting State v. Corpus Christi People‘s Baptist Church, Inc., 683 
S.W.2d 692, 695 (Tex. 1984)). 
434 HEB Ministries, 235 S.W.3d at 666. 
435 Id. at 667. 
436 Id. at 667–68. 
437 Id. (citing Emp‘t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878–79, 881 (1990)). 
24_ARIENS 7/30/2012  7:24 PM 
2194 Albany Law Review [Vol. 75.4 
designed to protect Texans from ―diploma mills‖ and from confusion 
about which educational documents should be understood as 
reflecting a ―degree‖ (whether an associate, bachelor‘s, master‘s, or 
doctoral).438 
In Pleasant Glade, the court held the church was not judicially 
estopped from making an appeal on religious liberty grounds.439  As 
it would be tried, the matter was ―an ecclesiastical dispute over 
religious conduct that would unconstitutionally entangle the court 
in matters of church doctrine.‖440  It dismissed the matter, holding it 
lacked jurisdiction.441 
Everyone agreed that members of the church physically 
restrained the plaintiff, seventeen-year-old Laura Schubert, on two 
separate occasions.442  Whether this touching was a forcible battery 
and false imprisonment was the factual question before the jury.443  
At the trial on her then-existing claims, the jury decided that 
question of fact in favor of the plaintiff and awarded her damages.444  
Before the trial, the church moved to dismiss the Schuberts‘s (her 
parents joined her as plaintiffs) suit on First Amendment grounds, 
claiming this was ―a dispute regarding how services should be 
conducted within a church, including the practice of ‗laying on of 
hands.‘‖445  The trial court denied the motion.446  In a mandamus 
proceeding before the court of appeals on that decision, all claims 
other than false imprisonment and assault (including, among 
others, professional negligence and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress claims) were dismissed as religious claims 
because they required an inquiry into the beliefs of the Pleasant 
Glade Assembly of God.447  The church acknowledged that Laura‘s 
bodily injury claims were secular claims.448 
After the decision of the court of appeals was rendered, the trial 
court issued a protective order prohibiting the plaintiffs from 
making any inquiry into the religious beliefs of the defendants, and 
ordered the parties to avoid speaking of any spiritual matters at 
 
438 HEB Ministries, 235 S.W.3d at 668–69. 
439 Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d 1, 2 (Tex. 2008). 
440 Id. at 2. 
441 See id. at 2, 9. 
442 See id. at 3–4. 
443 See id. at 5. 
444 Id. 
445 Id. 
446 Id. 
447 Id. at 5–6. 
448 Id. at 7. 
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trial.449  On appeal, defendants claimed that the judgment should be 
reversed on First Amendment grounds.450  The court of appeals held 
the church was judicially estopped from making this argument 
based on its prior mandamus filing.451  The Texas Supreme Court 
held judicial estoppel inapplicable because its allegedly inconsistent 
arguments were made in the same proceeding, not a prior 
proceeding, because the church gained no advantage from making 
the arguments it did, and, most importantly, because the church 
had consistently claimed a defense based on religious liberty 
grounds.452 
Once judicial estoppel was out of the way, the court headed to the 
church‘s religious liberty claim.  In the court‘s view, Laura 
Schubert‘s claim was ―not about her physical injuries.‖453  Her claim 
was essentially an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, 
a claim that had already been dismissed.454  Because the church 
espoused the practice of physically laying hands upon other 
congregants as part of its religious belief system, and because 
Laura‘s emotional injuries were entwined with the church‘s 
religious beliefs, the case had to be dismissed.455 
The dissent of Chief Justice Jefferson, as expected, began with his 
assessment of the court‘s judicial estoppel analysis.  He noted that 
because the court dismissed for a want of jurisdiction the judicial 
estoppel issue was beyond its mandate.456  Second, the court‘s 
rejection of the judicial estoppel conclusion threatened judicial 
integrity, for it allowed a party to take inconsistent legal positions, 
suggesting a court was misled on at least one of those occasions.457  
And the court‘s insistence otherwise was formalistic. 
On the religious liberty claim, the Chief Justice clarifies facts he 
believes were obfuscated by the court.  First, Schubert claimed 
physical as well as emotional injuries.458  Second, when she was 
initially physically restrained, congregants did so for two hours, not 
mere moments.459  Third, Pleasant Glade did not ask that the court 
instruct the jury to segregate physical and emotional damages, 
 
449 Id. at 5. 
450 Id. at 6–7. 
451 Id. at 7. 
452 Id. at 6. 
453 Id. at 8. 
454 Id. 
455 Id. at 10–11. 
456 Id. at 14 (Jefferson, C.J., dissenting). 
457 Id. 
458 Id. at 15–16. 
459 Id. at 15. 
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which waived that issue on appeal.460  As a legal matter, the court 
failed to explain how a submission of Schubert‘s emotional damages 
claims would inquire ―into the truth or falsity of the religious 
beliefs‖ of the defendants.461  Tort law allows an award for 
emotional damages ―for [an] intentional tort[] involving [a] physical 
invasion[].‖462  Why this battery and false imprisonment case is 
analogized to an intentional infliction of emotional distress case is 
unclear to the dissent.463 
The dissent does make clear that what the court is holding is that 
the First Amendment prohibits ―claims for emotional damages 
arising from assault, battery, false imprisonment, or similar torts,‖ 
a holding for which it can cite no other case in support.464  The Chief 
Justice then cites a litany of cases stating that religious liberty does 
not exempt a defendant from a claim of physical assault.465  Doing 
so in this case was not only making law, but making bad law. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The jurisprudence of Chief Justice Jefferson follows the best 
traditions of judging.  One of the nation‘s greatest judges, Benjamin 
N. Cardozo, gave the Storrs lectures at Yale Law School in 1921, 
published the same year, and entitled The Nature of the Judicial 
Process.466  He was fifty-years-old, with a formidable reputation.467  
His goal was practical, to explain what judges do in making 
decisions.468  The problem facing the judge, he wrote, was ―in reality 
a twofold one: he must first extract from the precedents the 
underlying principle, the ratio decidendi; he must then determine 
the path or direction along which the principle is to move and 
develop, if it is not to wither and die.‖469  Two ways in which 
 
460 Id. at 15–16.  
461 Id. at 16. 
462 Id.  
463 See id. at 15–17.  
464 Id. at 17. 
465 Id. 
466 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 3, 6 (1921).  A study of 
Cardozo‘s Storrs lectures is found in ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO 199–222 (1998). 
467 RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 80 fig. 1 (1990) (noting 
numbers of citations to opinions written by Cardozo and by other members of the New York 
Court of Appeals in 1914); Benjamin N. Cardozo, Judges, THE HIST. SOC‘Y OF THE CTS. OF THE 
ST. OF N.Y., http://www.courts.state.ny.us/history/cardozo.htm (last visited May 15, 2012).  
Cardozo was born in 1870 in New York.  Id. 
468 See CARDOZO, supra note 467, at 9–13 (explaining the process of judicial decision-
making). 
469 Id. at 28. 
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principles were developed were history and philosophy.470 
The opinions written by Chief Justice Jefferson meet both of 
Judge Cardozo‘s goals.  They seek the ―underlying principle‖ of the 
law and illuminate a path for that principle.  Of course, much of the 
work of state appellate judges presently involves statutory 
interpretation, which Cardozo‘s lectures noted, but to which he paid 
relatively little attention.471  Chief Justice Jefferson‘s opinions 
regularly interpret statutes and his explanations of the court‘s 
methodology and the social utility of such opinions is candid and 
considered. 
Chief Justice Jefferson will turn forty-nine in summer 2012,472 
having already served on the Texas Supreme Court for eleven 
years.473  He justifiably enjoys a strong reputation for sagacity and 
thoughtfulness.  He is a judge in full. 
 
470 Id. at 30–31.  The other two were custom, which Cardozo called the ―method of 
tradition,‖ and ―the mores of the day,‖ which he called the ―method of sociology.‖  Id. 
471 See id. at 69–70. 
472 Biography, supra note 3 (stating that Chief Justice Jefferson was born on July 22, 
1963). 
473 Chief Justice Wallace B. Jefferson, supra note 1 (explaining that Jefferson was 
appointed to the court in March 2001 by Governor Perry). 
